SPECIAL ISSUE:
RACE AND ETHNICITY
IN THE NEW SOUTH

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This paper presents a heuristic model for teaching about human variation and transformations of concepts of race over time. It suggests that key aspects of the complexities related to the topic can be fruitfully discussed by making use of the image of a feedback loop between folk models and scientific models of human kinds and human variations. In order to elucidate this discussion, a brief review of the history of racial thinking and some current ideas about race, genetics, and biomedicine are also presented.

Anthropology since its inception has been engaged in research and debate about the meaning and validity of racial categories. While the reality of race was once taken for granted, in recent years the view that “race is not an accurate or productive way to describe human biological variation” (Edgar and Hunley 2009: 2) has become widespread. Indeed, recent surveys and official statements from professional associations suggest that the pioneering critiques of traditional racial assumptions made by Franz Boas (1940 [1995]), Ashley Montague (1942 [2008]), and Frank Livingstone (1962) have been widely accepted among anthropologists in North America, although they have had uneven influence elsewhere (Lieberman et al. 2004; American Anthropological Association [AAA] 1998; American Association of Physical Anthropologists, 1996). My concern here, though, is not to discuss this development in all its detail. Rather, it is to provide a manageable approach.
way to present to undergraduate students beginning in anthropology enough background to understand race concepts and their current state of acceptance or rejection without overwhelming them with too much detail.

Leaving aside questions of scientific validity for the moment, which I will return to later, a major part of the explanation for the tenacity of traditional racial typologizing is surely that racial models provide apparently clear and simple ways of thinking about “us” and “them.” As Peter Wade (2004: 161) has put it, race provides “a tremendously powerful way of thinking about human difference, partly because it appeals to ideas about human nature.” Unfortunately, by comparison, recent anthropological descriptions and critiques do not have this virtue of simplicity. The view, epitomized by Livingstone’s well known aphorism that “there are no races, only clines” (Livingstone 1962: 279) still seems counterintuitive to many of our students, and is not without academic critics (Sesardic 2010). In any case, without an obvious link to familiar categories, more widespread acceptance of nuanced perspectives on human variation is surely hindered.2

There are other factors that have hindered awareness of the anthropological idea that our old racial categories are imprecise and cannot encapsulate the reality of human biological diversity. These days, many people are justifiably confused by information about diversity coming from scientists and medical professionals that seems contradictory. If there are no meaningful biological races, then how is it that medical researchers continue to report key differences related to health that use traditional racial labels? Is it not true, as has been reported, that blacks have greater susceptibility than whites to disorders such as prostate cancer and hypertension? Are not whites more likely than blacks to have different bone densities related to different rates of osteoporosis (Cooper, Rotimi, and Ward, 1999; Pollitzer and Anderson, 1989; Fausto-Sterling 2008)? What about the US Food and Drug Administration approval of the heart medication BiDil as a treatment for heart failure specifically geared toward blacks (Kahn 2008)? Other talk coming from those who work in the field of medical genomics has added further ambiguities to public discourse. How are teachers and lecturers to make sense of these apparently conflicting perspectives, both for themselves and for their students?

Despite the tremendous need for good teaching on this subject, too few pedagogical tools are available to instructors who aim to discuss elements of the complex history of race with a degree of digestible simplicity. The best route is certainly a complete course, perhaps following the example of Shanklin (1993) or Harris and Raimon (1998). Even with the recent efforts of the “Understanding

2 Cognitive anthropologist Lawrence A. Hirschfeld (1996) has argued that children have a psychological propensity to evaluate and label others by groups because the human mind operates in terms of such categories. Although to date the evidence presented for this is incomplete (Wade 2004:163-164), if racial typologies are effective memes that are learned and stick in mind with rather little effort, then this is especially problematic because they will be difficult to unlearn and “teach against.” Of course, the racial categories of common practice are not without ambiguity and complexity as, for example, Harris (1970) showed in reference to Brazilian racial classification. The point here is that ambiguous and complex things are not difficult to learn and maintain if they are framed appropriately.
Race” project of the AAA (http://www.understandingrace.org/home.html), however, there is still a need for college-level materials that can be presented in one or two lectures. To help meet this need, my aim here is to provide a set of graphics that may be incorporated into a 90 minute lecture about the dynamic history of racial conceptualizations. I will also provide some discussion of historical details with the hope that others may find this useful, although the graphics I suggest may be fleshed out with a wide variety of other specifics.

There are three basic perspectives I wish to get across at once. First, there is the idea of race as a folk model. Second is the idea of race as a scientific model. Third, there has been a dynamic interaction between dominant folk models and dominant scientific models of race throughout history that continues to the present (See figure one.) This folk-model scientific-model dynamic may be used to illustrate the history of concepts of human variation, the developments of scientific racial typologies, and the growing critique of the race concept. By showing feedback and a cycle of feedback loops, one can illustrate with numerous examples how the popular wisdom of an age has influenced the science of human variation and how the science of human variation in turn has affected the popular wisdom. That this is an ongoing process is the very reason why so much being said about race today appears muddled.

![Figure 1. The scientific-model folk-model feedback process.](image)

In preparing to teach about race and anthropology, one needs appropriate background. For the necessary details, there are a number of anthropological works available with broad historical perspectives. Marks (1995), Brace (2005), and Smedley (2007 [1993]) are particularly useful introductions that complement each other by way of different emphases. Another key source is the volume *Revisiting Race in a Genomic Age*. While not a text as such, this is a well-written and insightful work covering developments since the human genome project that is also worthy of inclusion in any reading list for a specialized upper division or graduate class (Koenig, Lee and Richardson [2008]). Finally, there is the special symposium issue of the *American Journal of Physical Anthropology* called *Race Reconciled: How Biological Anthropologists View Human Variation*, published in 2009, that provides more detail about recent work in biological anthropology.

In their introduction to *Race Reconciled*, Edgar and Hunley (2009:2-3) make several suggestions that relate to teaching. First, they argue that biological anthropology textbooks should provide more information about biomedical research as it relates to race. Second, there needs to be a better discussion of recent reconstructions of human population history, and the breadth of disagreement about them. Third, they suggest that relevant findings from different
anthropological subfields need inclusion as well. Unfortunately, it is probably not possible to approach this level of detail in a general anthropology classroom. Still, one approach suggested by the work of researchers such as Peter Wade (2004) and Clarence Gravlee (2009) is to start with a more holistic and synergistic model of biosocial interactions than is traditionally conceived in textbooks. However, to reiterate, my goal here is not to review everything there is to know about recent research. Rather, my goal is to present a heuristic that is simple but that does not preclude adding as much complexity as one would like.

The folk model concept I use is drawn from cognitive anthropology and ethnomsemantics. Folk models are types of narrative explanation or description that emerge informally and synergistically in the process of acts of communication, be they in the form of casual conversation, oral literature, Internet exchanges, or nonacademic written literature. Typically, folk models develop implicitly and reach a degree of standardization through the same sort of processes that make for the spread of rumor and legend (Fine and Turner 2001: 53-80). Racial categorization, as a type of folk thought, is based on the unexamined assumptions pertaining to physical appearances and perceived differences between groups that became widespread in eighteenth-century Europe (Hudson 1996). The importance of such an understanding of race as folk model is indicated by the fact that it features prominently in the most recent statement about race approved by the American Anthropological Association (1998). The perspective may also be gaining ground in applied areas of work, such as in education counseling (Cameron and Wycoff 1998).

The suggestion that the concept of race developed from folk understanding contrasts with the ideal image of scientific developments. Scientific models are meant to be descriptions and explanations drawn from empirical analyses, based on objective criteria of falsifiability, peer review, and replication of results. Scientists (except for the corrupt ones) believe that they should adhere to the scientific criteria of truth in their work. Nevertheless, the history of science shows the division between folk perceptions and scientific thought about race is rarely complete. As Audrey Smedley (2007:334) suggests, the folk concept of race “was elevated to the ranks of scholarly discourse when scientists began developing rationalizations and justifications for existing social realities.” Racial models, in other words, were ways of thinking that developed informally in a specific historical context, and then later influenced scholarly and scientific thought. Of course, it is also not a purely lopsided division in favor of folk models. The scientists of race not only borrow folk images, they also develop new ways of thinking about human variation.

3 The precise intellectual heritage of the “folk model” idea is difficult to trace. It appears similar to ideas put forth by German psychologist Wilhelm Wundt about the social nature of the everyday thought of the “Volk.” For contemporary anthropologists, the distinction between the folk or “little traditions” of rural communities and the high culture of metropolitan elites is familiar from the work of Redfield (1956). The folk models of cognitive anthropology are different from Redfield’s sense of folk traditions in that they are more pervasive in a society as a whole, generally being encoded implicitly in language. For an appreciative account of Wundt’s import in anthropology, see Goldenweiser (1933).
in doing what they believe to be purely objective research. This does not preclude the possibility of scientific progress, but it does suggest the need to be aware of cultural frameworks and political economic interests that may influence empirical concerns. On the one hand, for example, recent studies of neutral mutations are suggesting new ways of thinking about human biological history in terms of “serial population fissions, bottlenecks and long-range migrations” (Hunley, Healey and Long 2009:45). On the other hand, other studies are showing how the new biogenetics and its conceptualizations of human variation are influenced by the economic interests of biotechnology firms and pharmaceutical companies (Duster 2006).

Figure one makes it clear that the folk models and the scientific models of race are mutually reinforcing. Folk models influence the scientific models and the scientific models feedback to influence the folk models. Although this is a process that has been going on for several hundred years, much modern thinking about race can be traced back to common folk and scientific roots. The beginning of this interlinking relationship between the two frameworks on race is evident from the seventeenth century, when racial classification systems first began to be published in Europe. A brief quasi-scientific taxonomy published by the Frenchman Bernier in 1684, for example, depends upon popular European ideals of beauty among women. More than a hundred years later one of the founders of physical anthropology, John Blumenbach, made the “beauty” of the skull a key criterion in his racial taxonomy. Such folk ideals continued to influence prominent taxonomists into the twentieth century (Schiebinger 1993:126-133).

The Interaction of Folk and Scientific Models in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Europe

In teaching about this period, one may choose to delve into the assumptions of Bernier’s classification scheme, but the work of the famous Swedish naturalist Carolus Linnaeus (1707-1788) is more typically discussed. The value in reviewing these or other early models of race is that enough years have passed that we can see clearly the peculiarity of their folk assumptions, yet not so much times has elapsed that we cannot recognize the thought as like our own in some ways. Linnaeus’s taxonomy is quite familiar to us in that it is divided into the four categories we may recognize as our time’s folk classification of red, yellow, black and white. The way the members of these categories are typified is also not completely foreign—they are based on generalizations derived from impressions. To be more precise, Linnaeus’s evaluation of the four categories he called Afer, Americanus, Asiaticus, and Europeaeus are based on his perceptions of differences in skin

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4 Gould (1994), on the other hand, stresses the contributions of Linnaeus’s follower Johan Blumenbach (1752-1840), the man who coined the term “Caucasian.” From the perspective of this paper, Blumenbach is most interesting because he provided another early link in the chain of folk and scientific interaction. Because he thought people from the Caucasus region were better in that they were more beautiful than others, he provided academic legitimacy for the folk emphasis on racial aesthetics.
color, temperament, physical appearance, dress and moral authority. However, his other folk assumptions are more obscure and odd to us.

Given the desire to classify all of nature, the categorizations Linnaeus made were extremely concise, but in their contrasts they still say a great deal about popular preconceptions. Implicit in his typology are characterizations about difference derived from travelers’ accounts and the popular wisdom of the day. Three simple examples will suffice here to make the point. First, Linnaeus applied European traveler’s stereotypes in assigning the various humors to different races. This he did, for example, by typifying Europeans as “gentle, acute, and inventive” on the one hand, and Asians as “severe, haughty, and avaricious,” on the other. Second, he made implicit use of folk assumptions about the relationship between the female body and nature, particularly concerning human breasts and their folk association with nurturance and fertility (Schiebinger 1993). Finally, and perhaps most strikingly, Linnaeus included within his human category various forms of “monstrous races” believed to be real in the European imagination. The confusion of the times between the real and the imagined is evident in that imaginary wild hairy-men and nocturnal “Troglodytes” were mixed together with the very real pastoralist “Hottentots” of South Africa in the same category (Dickason 1984; Smedley 2007).

Even when not dealing directly with the subject of human beings, Linnaeus applied numerous metaphors in his classifications that were indicative of underlying folk belief about human social status. Peter Worsley (1997: 82) has pointed out, for example, how Linnaeus characterized certain varieties of lilies as “patrician” while he thought of some mosses and fungi as lowly “servants” and “vagabonds.” More dramatically, Linnaeus transferred a stereotype about the poor having large families to his observation of the fecundity of grasses. Grasses were said to be like the poor masses of humanity because “the more they were trod upon, the more they seemed to reproduce themselves.”

On the more academic side of its heritage, Linnaeus’s taxonomic system owed much to the Platonic notion that there was always a single ideal form of a species that best represented the species as a whole. In terms of his human varieties, this implied that there was an ideal “type-specimen” to be found in the real world that best represented each group. (The long-term result of this scholarly notion would be a reinforcement of popular tendencies to blur distinctions between individuals and groups.) Also derived from the Greeks were the four terms Linnaeus used for describing temperament—phlegmatic, melancholic, choleric, and sanguine. These terms, coming directly from ancient theory of body humors, were applied as emblems of the supposedly apathetic, sad, irritable or optimistic characters of the four types. The four racial categories are perhaps linked as well to both folk and scholarly emphasis on the four elements (air, earth, fire, and water) of alchemy and the four cardinal directions (Schiebinger 1993:119).

As suggested above, the work of Linnaeus did not simply reflect the folk imagination. On the contrary, the systemization of nature he envisioned was in turn to have a profound impact on such thinking. For example, historian
Mary Louise Pratt (1992) demonstrates that the scientific classification scheme of Linnaeus had a direct impact on how Europeans perceived the peoples they encountered in the colonial context. Educated people, in particular, although used to thinking of others in terms of some simplifying categories before Linnaeus, after Linnaeus began to observe people more in terms of racial labels, to the exclusion of attending to individuality. In Pratt’s terms, under the influence of Linnaeus European travelers came to see others as biological, denuded, and objectified bodies to be classified.

Although analyses of the works of Linnaeus give us strong clues about the developing European system of race, the encyclopedic *Natural History, General and Particular* by Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon, is a better source for reconstructing the history of European folk taxonomies and images of race. The *Natural History*, unlike the taxonomy of Linnaeus, contains many more of the descriptive accounts of European travelers that continued to serve as scholarly evidence. In a long section called “Varieties of the Human Species” in the eighth volume, Buffon (1812) summarizes many such accounts. His reckoning of them reveals a number of patterns that had developed in the popular imagination. The first pattern is familiar: ethnocentric stereotypes abound, and an emphasis is given to what was perceived to be beautiful or ugly about others, particularly their women. Like the tabloid journalists of today, Buffon and the writers he cites also placed special emphasis on the freakish appearance or oddity. For example, both men and women from Greenland were said to be ugly, but their women’s breasts were described as “so long and pliable, that they can suckle their children over their shoulders.” Similarly, the Ceylonese were said to have long ears that hung down to their shoulders. Belief in the monstrous races, too, was not completely cast aside as Buffon reported, although sometimes skeptically, descriptions of men with tails (Buffon 1812:331, 334, 345, 364; Schiebinger 1993: 126-134).

It should be noted that Buffon’s categorizations of others are not the broad sweeping stereotypes of a few racial categories, and they are not always negative. For example, in describing Africans, Buffon suggested that blacks were as variable as whites. Still, his descriptions often set up artificial contrasts of extremes. “The natives of Guinea are extremely ugly, and have an insufferable odor,” he believed, while those of Sofala and Mozambique “are beautiful, and have no bad smell” (Buffon 1812:39). And, color was never really ignored or considered objectively. While Buffon wrote that Wolof women were as beautiful as any to found in the world, this he could only admit with inclusion of the comment “abstracting from color” (Buffon 1812:379).

Buffon’s account was also characteristic of the times in that the distinction between physical form and culture was blurred or nonexistent, at least for non-whites. For example, when he described the Calmuch Tartars as ugly and frightful in their appearance, he also associated this with the opinion that they were “all robbers” (1812:311). Similarly, the Ainu of Japan were called “a gross and brutal race, having neither manners nor arts” (1812:321). On the other hand, when it was reported that there were people living among the Tartars, whose faces were “as
fresh and white as any in Europe” (1812:314) little was said about their customs. This, of course, is different from what tends to be emphasized about Buffon as a taxonomist. Here it is right to point out that Buffon rejected Platonic essentialism in favor of classificatory individualism, epitomized by his apothegm “individuals alone exist in nature” (Brace 2005:31).

**The Fractured Circles from Then to Now**

With its double arrow points, Figure 1 is meant to show that the racial classifications systematized by the scientists of race in turn influenced the popular wisdom. In fact, the scientific-sounding terms created by Linnaeus and Blumenbach and their followers became the common sense of succeeding generations, and are still in use. The Linnaean system initiated a long phase in intellectual history in which naturalists, the general public, and, later, anthropologists, hotly debated what the “correct” human classification scheme should be (Hannaford 1997). Under such influence, the detailed reports of exotic peoples and their customs given in previous periods were to be dismissed by succeeding generations of racial lumpers and classifiers as providing mere tiresome details (Hudson 1996:250).

![Figure 2. A “fractured circle” of race claims.](image)

From the time of Linnaeus forward, the dynamic interaction between the popular imagination and science becomes a mutually reinforcing feedback loop. Knowledge claims about race fly round and round, from folk model to science, from science to folk model, and then back again to science. In the process of this historical interaction, both the folk models and the scientific models are modified. The folk model influenced the development of the scientist’s classification schemes; the classification schemes influenced the popular view of races so that, no matter
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how innocent some may have been in intent, they inevitably suggested a scale with different ranks in the popular imagination, and so on. This dynamic interchange, which—I believe—continues to the present, can be reckoned as fractured circles or wheels of truth claims about race. The “fractured circle” image is meant to suggest that the transfer of information between popular culture and science has not always been a smooth one. A circle of truth may suggest a smoothly oiled and efficient wheel that churns out objective truth. But quite the contrary is the case: the fractured circle has been a clunky, dented, and shopworn wheel that has suffered from overuse. It remains to be seen if it will be superseded by new paradigms currently under development.

The fractured circle image also suggests that we cannot simply read back our contemporary views of race and place them into the minds of earlier generations of thinkers about human variation. The world of the early European explorers and colonizers was for them one of both exciting and frightening possibilities that are foreign to our way of thinking today. In those days, the human form was thought to be open to dramatic, seemingly magical, manifestations. However, as time went on, more naturalistic explanations were put forth to explain marvels of human variation.

Science and Folk Model Interactions in the Nineteenth and Twentieth-Centuries

By the nineteenth century, racial categorization was so well established that it was rarely questioned. The ideological assumptions of colonial and slaveholding folk models are readily observable in work thought by scientific practitioners of the period to be purely objective. Stephen Jay Gould’s (1996) The Mismeasure of Man provides one of the most engaging accounts of how unconscious folk models of race influenced the work of scientists at this time. While overstating the evidence in some cases, he nonetheless demonstrates many ways that supposedly objective measurements by scientists were influenced by folk model expectations.

The latter half of the nineteenth century was also a period in which the scientific models had a particularly profound influence on the folk models of race. As colonialism reached a mature stage, the ideas of Spencer and Darwin were used to provide further scientific justification for thinking of the world in terms of racial competition. Gould, Marks, Brace, Smedley, Hannaford and many others have described how nineteenth-century models of evolution and the “survival of the fittest” were used to provide justification for Europe’s acts to subjugate or even exterminate people said to represent primitive and inferior forms of humanity. Scientists also advocated policies of selective breeding, called “eugenics” by Francis Galton, which were popularized in many countries and carried forward in the twentieth-century with eugenics laws and the genocidal policies of the Nazis under Hitler.

In a controversial book on images of race and sports, Hoberman (1997) has argued that the perspectives of the nineteenth-century scientific-model of Social Darwinism survive in some contemporary folk images of athletics. Rather than
professional sports being a modern success story of integration and interracial cooperation as many believe, he suggests rather that the modern sports world is an arena for interracial competition and pseudo-Darwinian discourse about racial difference. As the colonialist saw himself as a natural ruler of natives—well-disciplined, brave, tough, and of superior intelligence—so too modern sports folklore often portrays white athlete as surviving by thought, discipline, and hard work in a world of physically more gifted blacks. The genocide in Rwanda in 1994, in which Hutu elites promulgated a neo-colonial form of racism against those identified as Tutsi or Tutsi allies, indicates in a more frightening way how old racial ideas can take on new and violent forms in contemporary times (Pottier 2002: 31-32).

Genetics and the Post-World War II Period

Nineteenth-century models of racial classification began to be seriously challenged in the twentieth-century as a result of dramatic developments in genetics and in the world of politics. In genetics, increasing knowledge about inheritance and the nature of DNA suggested that genetic distances between human populations were slight and that traits taken to be racial were independently inherited. In the world of politics, the rise and fall of Nazi racism indicated that a vision of human life based on the old racial folk model was inherently dangerous. In the postwar period, the development of anti-colonial and civil rights movements also challenged the old white-supremacist worldview. The new perspectives from science and political life were most effectively advocated and popularized in Montague’s classic Race: Man’s Most Dangerous Myth (1942), a book updated six times and still in print.

In certain scientific and political circles, therefore, a new perspective emerged that saw human population difference gradually distributed rather than discrete, and Linnaeus’s racial typologies as based on myth and social construction. As mentioned above, this was stated most pithily in Livingstone’s phrase that “there are no races, there are only clines,” but was not accepted without dissent (Lieberman, Kirk, and Littlefield 2003) and took years to gain widespread acceptance.

The tension between the older and newer models of race is understandable in the context of the folk-model and scientific-model interaction. This interaction is historically constituted, and at the present time we are still in a period of transition. This means that old and new ways of thinking are both to be found, and the newer ways of thinking have not yet become the dominant form of folk consciousness. As already suggested, part of the reason for this is that the transmission of folk ideas is facilitated by simplification of complexity. The old categories have the advantage in this regard because they seem so clear and unambiguous. While modern biology does not rule out the possibility of the existence of significant differences between certain human populations, it numbers these populations in the thousands, and explains their differences in terms of small changes in DNA frequencies due to such factors as genetic drift, differing effects of climate or disease vectors, patterns of splitting from ancestral African populations, or even epigenetics (Cavalli-Sforza
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and Cavalli-Sforza 1995; Hunley, Healy, and Long 2009; Kuzawa and Sweet 2008). The complexity of this information is itself something of a barrier, hindering even ready translation to other scientists working on different problems. As a result, more traditional images of race still abound in both scientific and popular discourse, leaving us with a situation that is often confused and fractious. One area this is most in evidence is that of medicine and biomedical research (Caulfield, Fullerton, Ali-Khan, et al. 2009). This is so important for understanding that it is worthy of some separate discussion.

Contemporary Medicine in Black and White. The continuing influence of folk perspectives on race in the biomedical field is so pervasive that one commentator has suggested that medicine provides “scientific legitimation of a flawed social construct” (Witzig 1996). The problem with biomedical research relating to human variation is that nineteenth-century models of race continue to be used in defining the research subjects, even in studies that purport to be exclusively about genetics (Osborne and Feit 1992; Witzig 1996; Hunt and Megyesi 2008). This continuing legacy of old racial typologies is particularly apparent in the emergent academic field and business enterprise of pharmocogenomics (Duster 2006; Fullwiley 2008; Kahn 2008). A recent study of 30 human genetics researchers from the US and Canada, for example, found that their definitions of racial and ethnic variables lacked “sufficient rigor to be used as key variables in biological research” because the definitions “were often lacking or unclear, the specific categories they used were inconsistent and context specific, and classification practices were often implicit and unexamined” (Hunt and Megyesi 2008:349).

An assumption of black uniformity is frequently encountered in the medical literature, despite the fact that it is directly contradicted by long-standing genetic research which finds African people to be extremely diverse genetically (Cavalli-Sforza 1994; Tishkoff et al. 1996). The black uniformity assumption occurs especially frequently in discussions of hypertension. For example, a study about Liddle’s syndrome (Baker et al. 1998), a rare form of hypertension caused by a mutation relating to sodium absorption, implies that black skin means genetic unity. Although the mutation responsible for Liddle’s syndrome was observed in only 20 out of 348 dark-skinned individuals the researchers surveyed, nothing was reported about the geographic point of origin of those who had the mutation other than to say they were “Black Caribbean” or “Black African.” More recently, Morris J. Brown, a professor of clinical pharmacology at Addenbrooke’s Hospital, the University of Cambridge, dichotomized hypertension into two types, with type 1 said to be “commoner in young white people” and type 2 said to be “commoner in young black people” (Brown 2006). Putting aside whether or not a condition of high blood pressure is an either/or dichotomy, this perspective again assumes a within-race uniformity that does not exist. (Fortunately, this was immediately pointed out by critics such as Agyemang and Bhopal [2006] and Okosieme [2006]). In fact, the view that there is such stark racial disparity in hypertension is contradicted by more thorough examination of evidence from the world’s populations (Agyemang et al. 2004). This debate also relates directly to the controversy about the racial profiling of the drug BiDil (Tate and Goldstein 2008:111-112; Kahn 2008).
Problems with an oversimplified notion of hypertension and human variation have been discussed now for quite some time. If some research has suggested a strong genetic-racial component for hypertension, it has not been convincing in light of other information showing that hypertension is extremely rare in Africa, that there is a gradient of high blood pressure rates from lowest to highest as one moves from Nigeria to Jamaica to the United States, and that this is not attributable to the known genetics of the renin-angiotension system (Cooper, Rotimi and Ward 1999; Fang et al. 1996; Forrester et al. 1998).

It is crucial to reflect here as well that “whiteness” as a category is not much more effective as a medical category. As one researcher in Britain has put it, “The routine use in medical research of an ostensibly homogeneous “white” category in ethnic group classification has meant that white minorities, such as the Irish, Turks, and Cypriots, have remained hidden” (Aspinall 1998). That this is a continuing problem is highlighted by the findings of Fullwiley (2008). Based on interviews and ethnographic observation among biomedical researchers in California, she found researchers continue to use folk models of pure ancestral types and white typicality as they seek out their research subjects. Even if such researchers are aware of the problems of oversimplification, the popular way people have come to think and write about “black” and “white” may make it seem awkward or unnecessary for them to be more specific.

Contemporary Racialist Research. Another way that folk models of race and science continue to interact can be seen in contemporary and ongoing racialist research. By racialist is meant research which utilizes nineteenth-century categories of race, but which at the same time modifies these categories to keep up with our contemporary folk assumptions. Although such research frequently receives blistering reviews from a majority of specialists, it continues to be fed by, and feed into, the folk model. The highly-publicized work of Herrnstein and Murray (1994), for example, shows the influence of old-fashioned hierarchical thinking about race and black intellectual inferiority, but it is also influenced by more recent popular representations of Asians as a “model minority.” It is no coincidence that Herrnstein and Murray’s work focused on three categories of race. By eliminating Native Americans as a distinct category, thus modifying Linnaeus, they are able to emphasize data that show East Asian superiority in IQ test performance. The book on race and sports by journalist Jon Entine (2000) also suffers from a confusion of categories as it evokes racial typology, nationality, and ethnicity in purported explanation of differences in athletic performance.

From a different perspective, the melanist-branch of Afrocentric scholarship (Pasteur and Toldson 1982; Ortiz de Montellano 1992) is also racialist in the above sense because it too accepts the old essentialist folk models while modernizing them. Like many in the medical profession and the larger American society, the melanists uncritically accept the assumption of black genetic and cultural uniformity, as well as folk images of whiteness. On the other hand, as with Murray and Herrnstein, they modify the old folk images to suit their purposes, in this case, to champion black superiority. Indeed, as historian Clarence Walker (1993:539) has indicated,
the racialist melanist accepts all the old Eurocentric assumptions and concepts, merely turning them around to favor blacks. The roots of this model undoubtedly lie in African American responses to years of subjection to European racist folk thought and practice. Yet, ironically, the melanist view serves to legitimate the very same categorical thinking which emerged from African and African American subjugation. Since melanism and Afrocentrism both use history and science to justify feelings of racial pride, their advocates are unfortunately caught in a bind. The rejection of the traditional premises of race becomes anathema to many African Americans because their social experience makes these folk assumptions entirely and unalterably real.

The Interaction between Folk Models and Scientific Models of Race in East Asia

So far in this paper the folk model—scientific model graphic has been employed primarily with North American and Western European discourse in mind. While lecturers in Western countries may not have time to explore wider patterns, the interaction between folk-model and scientific model seems at play equally in the discourses of other traditions as well. For example, there are patterns of acceptance and use of traditional racial typologies in Eastern Europe and Asia that suggest acceptance of regional folk models (Lieberman, et al. 2004; Kaszycka et al. 2009). In Asia, Takezawa (2006) shows the need to consider folk conceptions of traditionally excluded populations such as Japan’s burakumin; and an earlier collection of essays edited by Dikötter (1998) demonstrates a relationship between Chinese and Japanese folk models of lineage or “blood” ancestry and the scientific models of race utilized by some scholars from these countries. Furthermore, in a comparative analysis of racial discourse around the globe, Dikötter (2008:1478) has shown that modern “racist belief systems share a common language based on science.”

In reviewing racial discourse in China of the Republican period, Dikötter (1998:21) notes that there was a “significant degree of convergence between popular culture and officially sponsored discourses of race, of the sceptisation of folk models of identity and of the reconfiguration of stable notions of descent, lineage, and genealogy.” Feedback from the scientific model to the folk model is demonstrated in that, in the 1920s and 1930s, Chinese biologists and medical professionals promoted a eugenics movement. Like the Western social Darwinists, these Chinese professionals took their understanding of such scientific concepts as natural selection and assortative mating to mean that Chinese should marry and mate only with strong healthy partners. In this way they thought they could build a better Chinese race. Furthermore, they advocated that marital partners should be of “proper” Chinese descent so as to avoid racial degeneration.

Respected scientists within China continued to promote a scientized folk notion of race as descent. This is perhaps best exemplified by Chinese physical anthropologists who interpret fossil hominids such as the famous Homo erectus finds from Zhoukoudian in racial and nationalist terms. While non-Chinese
scholars such as Milford Wolpoff (Wolpoff and Caspari 1997) have argued that there is notable continuity between such finds and contemporary Asian peoples, they are careful to contextualize their discussion within an overall framework of common human origins and genetic interaction. Prominent Chinese scholars, on the other hand, have upheld positions very much closer to polygenism, the theory of separate and distinct origins or races (Dikötter 1998:28-29). By defining race as nationality, these scholars reinforce a government ideology which seeks to impose a common Chinese racial label to non-Han minority groups within China, thereby undercutting the claims of those who wish to stress a tradition of independence from Beijing.

Figure 3. The fractured circles of race. From the time of Linnaeus to the present.

Conclusions

Filling in Figure 2 with specifics, we obtain the following graphic depiction of the interaction between the folk models and scientific models of race from the time
of Linnaeus to the present. Dates of general time periods are shown here, with a sample of more specific examples. Obviously, these examples could be multiplied with numerous others at the instructor’s discretion. Like the previous figures, Figure 3 should be read with the understanding that folk models and scientific models are in dynamic interaction and contribute to each other’s mutual development.

This presentation obviously obscures many of the details of the interaction between science and popular thought. The purpose is to provide a final device for recollecting the outlines of a complex process that has been with us for far too many years. This is an interaction that began with the images picked up by Linnaeus, and continues yet with contemporary disputes about the meaning and importance of the race concept. If in reality our answers are not simple, it should be our duty to explain clearly why this is so. It is hoped that the use of the folk-model scientific-model dichotomy will help make explicit many of the inherited assumptions about race and human variation that are still with us today.

With the hope that they may facilitate discussion among those students who read this article or hear lectures based on the ideas presented, I close with a set of sample questions and issues for further consideration.

**Questions and Issues for Further Consideration**

(1) What is the difference between folk and scientific models of a concept? How can they be distinguished?
(2) How does this article suggest folk and scientific models of race were formed historically? How have they been said to interact?
(3) In sociology and cultural anthropology, it is often said that race is socially constructed. Evidence of this comes from analysis of the racial terms used in different societies such as Brazil, the United States, and South Africa. Interpret this in terms of the “folk model” idea.
(4) Does Livingstone’s view that “there are no races only clines” mean that there are no biological differences between human groups? Why or why not?
(5) In your experience, in what ways are new and old ideas about race being used today? What statements about racial differences are common? What statements are you unsure about?

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Talk of ‘Broken Borders’ and Stone Walls: Anti-immigrant Discourse and Legislation from California to South Carolina

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The anti-immigrant sentiments that propelled the passage of California Proposition 187 in 1994 – linked to an economic downturn and worries about NAFTA – have been echoed across the U.S. over the intervening sixteen years. This article briefly reviews public discourse about anti-immigrant legislation in a wave of other states from California to South Carolina, and discusses the convergence of anti-immigrant and white supremacist projects in the U.S., using the concepts of market citizenship and citizen surveillance. As new anti-immigrant legislation is proposed in the South, understanding it within its national and historical context is important. This discussion includes consideration of the role of metaphor in both fueling and countering anti-immigrant discourse.

Anti-immigrant discourse: ‘broken’ borders and stone walls

Legislation that may be worded in terms of protecting U.S. or state citizens but be referred to in public discourse as anti-immigration or anti-immigrant legislation has been making its way through statehouses across the U.S. over the past decade and a half. This is the latest round of legislation blaming recent immigrants (often from a specific nation or set of nations) for economic hardship or criminal activity in the U.S., which is portrayed as possible to alleviate with the removal or barring of undocumented or “illegal immigrants.” The research question taken up here is: what larger discursive projects (e.g., racializing projects, cf. Omi and Winant 1994, or economic projects) do specific acts of anti-immigrant legislation fit into, and how might state legislation – most recently proposed in southeastern states – be understood as part of a national political project? In this article, I demonstrate some ways to situate local anti-immigration legislation within that larger national context through the concepts and methods of anthropology. I argue that anthropological perspectives can contribute to both academic and social justice
activist analyses of anti-immigrant legislation (which is focused especially on recent immigrants from Latin American nations, often glossed collectively as “Mexico” in public discourse), and that such analyses are particularly needed in southeastern U.S. states like South Carolina at this juncture. There is a rapidly growing new immigrant population from Latin America and other global regions, and both the immigrant rights NGO infrastructure and the new structures of governmentality for immigration enforcement (the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement system, devolving such enforcement to local authorities) are just being established in some areas and may lack the linguistic and cultural resources emphasized as vital by anthropologists.

This article emerges from a long-term ethnographic research project in which I have been studying how individuals (often without ever reading the legal documents themselves) make sense of policies related to globalization and anticipate the effects of those policies, like the North American Free Trade Agreement, on their everyday lives. In this larger project, I use political economic and interpretive theoretical lenses to focus on the cultural logics – e.g., the logic of neoliberal capitalism – that both inform and are constructed through individual explanations and actions. As Fleck (1935) and Douglas (1986) have noted, it is extremely challenging to think outside our own “thought styles,” or the cultural logics into which we have been socialized. Weber’s (1977) initial project on interpreting the logic of capitalism and how it related to other logics (religious ones, in his example) has inspired quite a few anthropologists like me to see the potential of using political economic and interpretive theoretical perspectives together to see economic and political decisions as culturally contextualized.

This project is also situated within the anthropology of law, or political anthropology. Carol Greenhouse (2006: 189) has pointed out that today, “anthropologists are working on legal doctrine, and lawyers are working on cultural practice.” In her review of recent studies of law, she found discursive analyses to be commonly used across disciplines, and among the most common research themes to be “rights (individual rights, indigenous rights, and human rights), and security,” which are prominent themes in this article on the spread of anti-immigration legislation. Discourse analysis, or the tracking of collective strands of explanation and action (including assertions of power, identity, and rights, for example), is a common method used in legal anthropology. As Greenhouse (2006: 200) explains, “A theory of discourse helps to account for how states are rendered social through language and the interplay of subjective experience among ordinary people in their everyday lives, as well as how states figure in history through collective identities created in those very processes.” In looking specifically at how anti-immigration legislation fits into a larger cultural landscape of contested assertions of rights, identity and power, I join anthropologist Nicholas De Genova and others in using the concepts and methods of our discipline to investigate the broader cultural logics at issue. “It thus becomes possible for the ethnographic study of undocumented migrations to produce migrant ‘illegality’ as the kind of ethnographic object that can serve the ends of a distinctly anthropological critique of nation-states and their
immigration policies, as well as of the broader politics of nationalism, nativism, and citizenship” (De Genova 2002: 423).

As I was doing ethnographic interviewing and discourse analysis between 1993 and 1996 on what people (in many occupations, identifying themselves in many ways) in the U.S. and Mexico thought of the North American Free Trade Agreement for my book *NAFTA Stories: Hopes and Fears in Mexico and the United States* (Kingsolver 2001), I found that racialized and national identities were often conflated in narratives about threats to economic nationalism and job security. As I researched those narratives more, and studied speeches and political advertising and cartoons related to California Proposition 187 (an anti-immigrant bill proposed in 1994, the year NAFTA was being debated and voted on), I learned that metaphors related to the U.S.-Mexican border – e.g., a stone wall, a leaky membrane, the Berlin Wall -- became a vehicle for what was being said both overtly and between the lines about citizenship and economic entitlement. In 1996, I moved from California to South Carolina, and since then, I have continued to study anti-immigration legislation, through some ethnographic interviews but mostly through the close textual analysis of the laws themselves, evidence regarding the funding of political advertising campaigns, the analysis of aggregate data (e.g., U.S. Census data), and narrative analysis of documents including political speeches and letters to the editor. As an anthropologist, I believe it is important methodologically for us to study state and local anti-immigration laws within a national and transnational context, since there are national movements providing funding to local anti-immigration campaigns at strategic moments, for example, and I have watched similar proposed legislation make its way from California to South Carolina over more than a decade. It is that larger pattern of anti-immigration legislation and the selective marking and unmarking of individuals and groups as “citizens” or “illegal immigrants” (whatever their actual status might be) that interests me here. Pablo Vila’s (2000) research on the use of metaphors and the variety of narratives in constructing “border” identities demonstrates excellent methodological techniques in this type of research. The work I have done for this article is much more limited to discourse analysis, but as I have noted, it is situated within a larger ethnographic project yielding the observations about motivations for proposing anti-immigrant legislation across the U.S.

The day before I submitted this article for publication, in May 2010, I received a mass e-mail from South Carolina Senator Jim DeMint asking me to “tell Congress to build the fence!” He referred to the Secure Fence Act passed 5 years earlier, in which “we promised to build 700 miles of double layer fencing on our border with Mexico.... Less than 35 miles of fencing have been completed!” he said. “Americans have demanded a real fence to combat the very real problems of illegal immigration that have led to human trafficking, drug trafficking, kidnapping and violence on our border.” So it is with the fence metaphor that I will begin my argument in this article.

When the U.S. Senate voted in support of South Carolina Senator Lindsey Graham’s amendment to the Homeland Security Department appropriations bill
in 2007, the Republican Senator could begin distancing himself from the title Rush Limbaugh had given him of “Lindsey Grahamnesty” and the related conservative dissent over the immigration reform bill that he had not been able to get passed earlier in the year. The issue has been reframed from discussions of the Z visa and the legal and cultural meanings of “amnesty” to the language of national security, national emergency, and the threat of terrorism that has characterized both U.S. political discourse and some of the most egregious hate crimes and sanctioned discrimination in the U.S. since 9/11/01.

After the Senate vote for his amendment, Senator Graham said: “Securing our border is a national emergency because it’s a national-security problem not to be able to control who comes into your country” (Graham, as quoted by Rosen 2007a). What I focus on in this article is the selectivity in this discourse: securing the U.S.’ southern border is represented as more of a security threat than the northern border -- despite arrests defined as terrorist-related being more frequent on the Canadian border -- and, especially, I focus on just who is represented as constituting the national public perceived to be under threat from the “uncontrolled” flow of immigrants across the southern border. In the first part of the argument, I will relate the recent rhetoric about immigration legislation to an analysis of public discourse about California Proposition 187 at the time of its passage in 1994 (based on my interviews with Californians at the time) and trace a brief history of anti-immigration at various jurisdictional levels across the U.S. from California to the Southeast since the mid-1990s. Then I will move on to a discussion of the convergence of anti-immigrant and white supremacist political projects and some conceptual frameworks for thinking about anti-immigrant discourse, particularly market citizenship and citizen surveillance.

When the Senate passed the “emergency” funding to fortify the U.S.-Mexican border, Senator Graham said: “The vote was overwhelming because everybody agrees that the broken borders we have today are not in our national security interests” (Graham as cited by James Rosen 2007b). Lou Dobbs of CNN has also used the term “broken borders” in discussions of immigrants from Mexico as an “army of invaders” (Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting 2007). This choice of the term broken borders suggests a disturbing current rupture in what was once a hermetically sealed boundary, which does not reflect experience but which has tremendous rhetorical power. The term broken conveys also a need for repair, and the assumption that it would be natural to spend money as a national public on completing this emergency repair, as those in Holland might vote to repair a breach in a dyke. In fact, it seems to mobilize more attention than repairs still needed in New Orleans’ levees.

After the immigration reform legislation he helped propose earlier in 2007 did not pass, Senator Graham was told by his colleagues to focus on the need to secure the southern national border. Representative Duncan Hunter, a Republican from California, said that there ought to be “a very strong sense of urgency in this country to simply carry out the law, the mandate, for 854 miles of fence that we passed.... They’ve only built 13 miles of the fence so far” (Hunter as cited by Babington 2007).
As in recent references to Fortress Europe, when individual national economic or political sovereignty appears diminished, talk turns toward border fortifications and blame of selectively marked immigrant groups. According to Ong (2007: 15), there are now discussions in Europe of granting different kinds of graduated citizenship, or postnational citizenship, with different levels of rights, to different immigrant groups within the EU. Fox (2005) discusses rights and claims in relation to “multi-layered citizenship.” As Ong (1999) points out, citizenship is not fixed but flexible, and we need to understand the logics through which arguments about citizenship and transnationality are made.

This current focus on building a wall between the U.S. and Mexico brings to mind an earlier period when the wall proposal was taken less seriously as a construction project and treated more as a metaphor, like viral contagion, for the perceived economic and physical threat immigrants from Latin America represented to an assumed public, racialized inaccurately as a default white votership in much anti-immigrant rhetoric in California in 1994. When California Proposition 187 – the ballot initiative that would have made it illegal to provide health care or educational services to undocumented immigrants – was being debated before the vote in California, Kemchs drew a cartoon that appeared in Los Caricaturistas in Mexico in October 1994 that equated Proposition 187 with the construction of a stone wall topped by barbed wire between Mexico and the U.S. Political cartoonists in Mexico were not hesitant about bringing into public discourse the link between anti-immigrant legislation and white supremacist political projects (and funding); several cartoons equated Governor Pete Wilson’s advocacy of California Proposition 187 with Hitler’s role in the Holocaust. While hyperbole is the stock in trade of political cartoonists, I argue that in Mexican civic space it was more possible than in the U.S. to talk publicly about white supremacy and U.S. immigration legislation as overlapping political projects.

Researchers including Jean Stefancic (1997) and William Tucker (2003) have discussed the relationship between white supremacist funding and well-financed campaigns for anti-immigrant legislation across the U.S. The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), probably with Pioneer Fund backing (Stefancic 1997), targeted the “white” vote in California with the “Save Our State” initiative (although by no means did the vote break down along the lines of stated identities). That rhetoric equated citizenship with whiteness and placed the responsibility for the state’s economic downturn on the undocumented workers (assumed to be non-white) whose labor actually contributed to California’s being (at that time) the eighth largest trading body in the world. The Federation of American Immigration Reform also “bankrolled Proposition 200” in Arizona (Judis 2006). In U.S. public space, though, there is largely silence about the link between white supremacist and anti-immigration sentiment, or outright rejection of it, as in South Carolina’s U.S. Senator Jim DeMint’s remarks in 2007 after he and others voted down the immigration reform bill that his fellow South Carolina Congressman Lindsey Graham had supported. Senator DeMint said, to a reporter: “We’ve gotten thousands of calls, and I haven’t gotten one call that could have been
interpreted in any way as anti-immigration.... It is more really about our country and what it means to be a citizen and enforcing the rule of law, and basically our oath of office that is to swear to protect the Constitution.... I have not sensed any racism or any fear of diversity or the things that have been leveled against some of us” (DeMint, as cited by Rosen 2007c).

The links between dollars going to specifically white supremacist causes and the anti-immigrant publicity are hard to trace, and are rarely announced publicly. Disguised as populist groundswells, such targeted campaigns often appear and disappear in ways that seem a bit mysterious to those not funding them, but I would join others in arguing that these campaigns are connected nationally. For example, in the spring of 2000, as John McCain, George W. Bush, and other Republican contenders for the presidential nomination moved into South Carolina and worked the state before the primary vote, Project USA anti-immigration signage went up around the state – including one on a billboard right over one of Columbia, South Carolina’s two mosques that said “90 percent of U.S. population growth in the 21st century will result from current immigration; stop it, Congress.” Anti-immigration television advertisements were broadcast frequently. The ads stopped and the billboard signs made way for Chick-fil-A’s misspelling cows as soon as Bush had won the primary. More research needs to be done on the national funding of such state and local campaigns. An organization cannot simply be labeled white supremacist without extensive research, of course, but there is a genealogy of political priorities and funding to trace carefully, as with the Pioneer Fund. The Federation for American Immigration Reform has data available for anti-immigration researchers on its website, http://www.fairus.org, arguing that there is a discontinuity between today’s immigration situation and any previous era, and that it is time to close the “frontier” since the massive illegal immigration of Mexicans is – the site argues – jeopardizing the U.S. economy.

Here are two examples of the formation of local anti-immigrant organizations that were organized or assisted by national anti-immigrant organizations: the Federation for American Immigration Reform and the Minutemen Civil Defense Corps. The local efforts were directly tied to moments in which there was proposed anti-immigrant legislation at the local level, in the first case, or at the national level, in the second. James Claffey (2006) has published a description of the formation of the Sachem Quality of Life (SQL) organization in Farmingville, New York (on Long Island) and the small group’s attempts “to speak for” the entire community in protesting the presence of undocumented immigrant workers:

Composed of thirty to forty working-class, native-born residents, this group began a media blitz demanding that public officials at the local and federal levels act immediately. They also spoke to immigration officials (the INS) and began a generalized campaign to rid the town of the undocumented. (Claffey 2006: 75)

Claffey goes on to note that FAIR sent in a national organizer and violence against undocumented workers began to escalate. While SQL members do not claim any responsibility for hate crimes, as their anti-immigrant rhetoric and harassment
increased, two workers from Mexico were picked up by two young men who claimed they had construction work for them but then attacked the workers brutally in an abandoned building.

Picked up a few days later, one of the perpetrators was found to have Nazi and white-supremacy tattoos. As became clear during the trial, they were ‘out to get some Mexicans,’ clearly a hate crime. They are currently serving twenty-five years for attempted murder. (Claffey2006: 78)

Then, Claffey (2006: 79) reports, “five white teenagers, residents of Farmingville, fire-bombed the house of a Mexican family of four in town.” Much more research of the kind Kathleen Blee (2002) has done on local and national Ku Klux Klan activity is necessary to bring accountability to white supremacist organizations – perpetrators of hate speech – for hate crimes like these in Farmingville, New York.

As new immigrants from Latin America settle in increasing numbers in regions of the U.S. without a history of Latino community members, national anti-immigrant and hate groups see growth opportunities. In South Carolina, which has one of the most rapidly growing new populations of recent immigrants from Latin America to the U.S., the proposal of national immigration legislation in 2007 was quickly mirrored by local anti-immigration organization orchestrated through national groups. The state president of the national organization the Minutemen Civil Defense Corps (MCDC) said to the 150 people gathered to form the new Horry County chapter of the MCDC about the ‘invasion’ of ‘illegal immigrants’: “We’ve got to get rid of them, one way or another” (The Myrtle Beach Sun News 2007). More studies are needed of the links between this kind of violent speech to all the levels of violence Bourgois (2001: 6-7) has described: political, structural, symbolic, and everyday.

One form of symbolic violence is the selective use and valorization of the term ‘immigrant’ in dominant discourses in the South over time. The organization of labor has been global in this region since before the U.S. was a nation, but enslaved Africans were not spoken of as immigrants in the same way that free Europeans with capital were mentioned in dominant discourse. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, for example, South Carolina legislators annexed land from African American farmers, bought a steamship, and offered northern Europeans with at least $6,000 free passage to South Carolina and free land for settlement. The South Carolina Commissioner of Agriculture, Commerce and Immigration (an interesting combination of portfolios), in his first report to the governor of South Carolina in 1880, said:

The question of whether we desire or require immigration is no longer debatable. To keep pace with the progress of the world, we must have our waste lands settled, our idle resources developed, our streams running machinery. We can never induce capital until we have the population.... An emigrant agent located in New York says, now is the time for the South to act. This State can easily double her population, increase her wealth 300 per cent, reduce taxes and pay off her debt.... The odium in which the
institution of slavery was held by immigrants, previous to the late civil war prevented a rapid settlement of the South. That objection has been removed by the abolition of slavery, and South Carolina now offers greater inducements to immigrants than any of the Northern or Western States. [First Annual Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of South Carolina, 1880: 22-23]

Note that the African Diaspora in South Carolina was not labeled, in this document, an immigrant group. The selective marking of groups as immigrants or not, desirable or not, has been ongoing in dominant discourses in South Carolina. The latest iteration is the bill that South Carolina State Senator Glenn McConnell introduced in the 2009-2010 session of the Senate: S 306, which would prevent undocumented workers (called illegal aliens) from receiving workers’ compensation if injured on the job, if the employer was aware of the worker’s undocumented status before the accident. This is compatible with the structural violence of the imposition of local ICE (replacing INS) authority across the South, a system in which local law enforcement officials now carry federal authority, and recent restructuring of the poultry work force in South Carolina due to immigration raids. Those 2008 and 2009 raids rendered visible labor relations and marginalized workers who had largely been invisible in dominant discourse, and that exacerbated anti-immigrant discourse. As Benson (2008: 596) points out, “power and perception overlap,” and that “[f]aciality is crucial to the constitution and perpetuation of structural violence because how people see others can help legitimize patterns of social subordination, economic exploitation, and spatial segregation.” Once undocumented poultry workers in South Carolina were stigmatized in the news, there were fears of broader anti-immigrant and anti-Latino discrimination (Ordonez 2008), and many recent Latino immigrants lost jobs in the poultry plants in Greenville and Columbia, replaced mostly by prison workers (another form of structural violence that is not always rendered visible in public discourse, although prison uniforms are visible on the South Carolina statehouse lawn most any day, worn by grounds crews).

The relationship between the encouragement of fear of deportation, as through the recent ICE raids in South Carolina, and the need to maintain a low-wage labor force including workers with varying degrees of citizenship has been described well by De Genova (2002: 439):

Migrant ‘illegality’ is lived through a palpable sense of deportability, which is to say, the possibility of deportation, the possibility of being removed from the space of the nation-state.... Thus, the legal production of ‘illegality’ as a distinctly spatialized and typically racialized social condition for undocumented migrants provides an apparatus for sustaining their vulnerability and tractability as workers.

The racialization that is part of this process is discussed in the next section.

**Selective racialization and the politics of blame**

A “moral” aspect of the neoliberal capitalist project is the displacing of responsibility for economic and social difficulties onto a strategically stigmatized
group, as in the politics of blame (cf. Farmer 1992) that propelled the passage of California Proposition 187 in 1994. I have discussed this larger process elsewhere as strategic alterity, or “shifting between different assertions of devalued group identity in order to valorize free-trading citizens of the market and to mask the labor of those making that free market participation possible (by moralizing the devalorization)” (Kingsolver 2007: 87). The text of Proposition 187 (which was later ruled unconstitutional) actually blames undocumented immigrants for economic hardship during Governor Pete Wilson’s administration. A parallel process in the U.K. to the politics of blame invoking the word “Mexican” in the U.S. is the racializing project invoking “Paki,” a shortened version of the word “Pakistani,” used pejoratively to refer to immigrants from many nations. Michael Finewood (2005: 57), in an analysis of representations of Latino immigrants in South Carolina, argued that the rhetoric of “illegal” status conferred a related assumption about the criminality of recent immigrants from Latin America, reflected in allusions by those he interviewed to drug cartels and “sneakiness”. The ballot version of Proposition 187 began with these words, which certainly equated undocumented status with criminality:

The People of California find and declare as follows:
That they have suffered and are suffering economic hardship caused by the presence of illegal aliens in this state.
That they have suffered and are suffering personal injury and damage caused by the criminal conduct of illegal aliens in this state.
That they have a right to the protection of their government from any person or persons entering this country unlawfully.

Which Californians needed protection from whom? The rhetorical sleight of hand here between citizenship, whiteness, and the threat posed by (a selectively marked group of) immigrants was a powerful one. Charles Briggs (2005) has proposed the analytical model of “spheres of communicability” to examine the ways in which racializing and medicalizing discourses intersect in constructing subjectivities, and that is certainly applicable to the ways in which racializing discourses and a number of other discourses have overlapped in the selective stigmatization of “immigrants” – of necessity, a reification – in anti-immigrant discourse in the U.S. The discourse through which Proposition 187 was promoted – in speeches and media advertisements – masked the complexity of identity and immigration by equating the term “immigrant” with the term “Mexican,” which was curiously racialized even as it was gendered and nationalized (cf. Vila 2000; Kingsolver 2001). The identities of immigrants from many nations were reduced, in the “Save Our State” initiative, to the term “Mexicans” meant to distinguish a racialized, gendered (male), Spanish-speaking, national other from a Californian self assumed in the promoting rhetoric to be “white” (and threatened, according to Zavella 1997). While there are many ways to conceptualize the relationship between racialization and class processes, I agree with Charles W. Mills (1997: 32-33) that:

...the economic dimension of the Racial Contract is the most salient, foreground rather than background, since the Racial Contract is calculatedly aimed at economic exploitation. The whole point of establishing a moral
hierarchy and juridically partitioning the polity according to race is to secure and legitimate the privileging of those individuals designated as white/persons and the exploitation of those individuals designated as nonwhite/subpersons.

I believe the simplification of identities in the discourse promoting California Proposition 187 was tied directly to the production of (white) citizens of the market, and those (non-white, non-citizens) who reproduce them (in the Marxian sense). Joseph Nevis (2002) has also stated (in his history of the U.S. policy Operation Gatekeeper) that arguments about security, employment, racialization and “illegal” immigration have to be considered in the same frame. He documents why public attention has been on the undocumented immigrant workers rather than the employers providing their jobs.

Neoliberal capitalist rhetoric facilitates the construction of an unmarked, or ‘white,’ working self, free to sell one’s products on the world market, somehow linked (either vertically in the industry, or symbolically) with the owners of capital, and a marked ‘strategic other,’ the worker who helps the free-to-sell worker get the work of production done. I think market citizenship (Kingsolver 2001) is distinct from national citizenship, and see the former as being used to argue for or against groups’ rights within nation-states regardless of legal status. Aihwa Ong (2007) discusses this as “graduated citizenship”:

... differentiated spaces of the political are often coordinated with diverse modes of government – disciplinary, regulatory, pastoral – that administer populations in terms of their relevance to global capital.... Such differential biopolitical investments in different subject populations privilege one ethnicity over another, male over female, and professional work over manual labor, within a transnationalized framework. (Ong 2007: 78–79)

Ong has further argued that:

... components formerly tied to citizenship – rights, entitlements, as well as nation and territoriality – are becoming disarticulated from one another and rearticulated with governing strategies that promote an economic logic in defining, evaluating, and protecting certain categories of subjects and not others. (Ong 2007: 16)

Whether we talk about this process as othering, alterity, xenophobia, or racial formation (Omi and Winant 1994), the collapsing of multiple ethnic, transnational, and gender identities into an underclass, male, dark-skinned, transgressive “Mexican” was prominent in the discussions of California Proposition 187. Governor Pete Wilson and other proponents of the legislation always mentioned Latino undocumented immigrants as those responsible for economic hardship to the state and undeserving of health and educational benefits, as though all were of a single class and racialized identity, or “Mexicans,” and never marked undocumented immigrant groups currently racialized as ‘white.’ Richard Delgado (1999: 251) has noted, “efforts to limit citizenship are efforts to maintain a system of white supremacy and to give that system the veneer of fairness and principle.” And Renato Rosaldo (1999: 257), in a discussion of cultural citizenship, said, “in
California statewide initiatives provide citizens with an occasion for voting their prejudices. Proposition 187 was arguably in large measure an expression of white supremacy.” R. Michael Alvarez and Tara L. Butterfield (2000), political scientists, used the Voter News Service exit polls to interpret why the 59% of California’s voters who passed Proposition 187 voted for it; they concluded that the passage of Proposition 187 was linked with “cyclical nativism” related to a poor economy and with endorsement of the policy by gubernatorial and senate candidates, who often used stereotypical images of immigrants in their campaign ads. While the thrust of the legislation was symbolic, one of the outcomes was an unprecedented level of Mexican immigrants seeking U.S. citizenship, which Santamaría Gómez and Zackrison (2003) attributed to a desire to vote in U.S. elections like the one in which Proposition 187 had been passed.

The stereotype of a male migrant worker, coming to steal jobs or luring them over the Mexican-U.S.A. border with Ross Perot’s (Perot with Choate 1993) articulated “giant sucking sound,” was used as a nationalist axe to divide workers and actively unmarked the common goals of the neoliberal administrations of Mulroney, Bush, and Salinas through NAFTA to attract capital (including the investments of Mexican millionaires) to a North American market from the European Union. Gendering, racializing, and otherwise stereotyping the “Mexican” was facilitated by the availability of vilifying images in Hollywood representations of a Mexican other as a storytelling foil over most of the twentieth century (Flores 1995). In his analysis of representations of new immigrants on U.S. magazine covers, Leo Chavez (2001: 21) found that although representations of immigrants were complex and often contradictory, alarmist imagery always rose in moments of economic downturns. Kevin Keogan (2002: 231) argues that only under favorable economic and cultural conditions is there the possibility of “an inclusive political orientation toward illegal immigrants.”

**Policing the margins: citizen surveillance and market citizenship**

How can a population be mobilized to police the margins of who is allowed to be a free-trading citizen and who is strategically altered as a silenced non-citizen of the market supporting that status? Lee Baker has described that the Louisiana statute affirmed by the Supreme Court in the Plessy vs. Ferguson decision required that conductors assign and enforce constructions of passengers’ race or be fined and possibly imprisoned (Baker 1998: 24). On the streets of Atlanta described by Du Bois in *The Souls of Black Folk* (1903), who was it that would enforce the law forbidding those racialized as black and white from having a conversation? The enforcement of such a law would have required not only police surveillance but also citizen participation in the kind of racial profiling that has its descendants in the Neighborhood Watch programs and the TIPS program of the twenty-first century. Legally sanctioned racialized segregation in the U.S. required citizen surveillance – thus the very nature of the term *vigilante*. I argue that the political legacy of California Proposition 187 was the resurgence of this citizen surveillance implied
as those racialized as *white* policing the borders of whiteness both figuratively and literally. Smith (2006) has pointed out the pitfalls of leaving it up to the individual eye to identify those who represent a threat to the national public. As Foucault would remind us, racial profiling is – at its core – about disciplining the public and reinforcing governmentality rather than about personal or national security.

Even though Governor Pete Wilson, re-elected on the same ballot on which Proposition 187 appeared, stated in a pre-election debate earlier in 1994 that he knew the initiative could never become an enforceable law, its role in affirming an explicitly and implicitly white supremacist discourse in California was powerful, as were the associated expressions of violence ranging from turning renters out of their housing to beatings and killings of those perceived as undocumented immigrants. The stereotypes promoted through the support and passage of California Proposition 187 were not merely annoying or misleading; they were very, very dangerous. Hate crimes against Latinos increased sharply after the passage of Proposition 187 (Finnigan 1995: 6). Since it is impossible to tell citizenship by looking at a person, the discrimination affected citizens and non-citizens alike. The pro-187 advertisements portrayed a California being overrun by undocumented Latinos. The largest concentration of undocumented Latinos is in Los Angeles County, according to Rodriguez (1996: 18), and in that county, 80 to 85% of foreign-born Latinos were U.S. citizens in the mid-1990s. The Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles documented the increase in incidences of hate crimes and other acts of discrimination against Latinos in the period following the passage of California Proposition 187, aimed against citizens of the U.S. and of other nations alike, based on visual marking of individuals as “the other.” Many of these experiences of discrimination were specifically racialized. A Latina mother (with U.S. citizenship) and her children, for example, were told by their apartment complex manager that they could not use the pool after 6PM because in the evenings it was “for whites only” (Finnigan 1995: 6). Another U.S. citizen, a Latina, was turned away from a hospital while she was hemorrhaging. She was told that the hospital no longer treated Hispanics. As a result, she lost her baby (Martinez 1995: 18). The Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles reported many more examples, often more violent than these, of empowered hatred against visually targeted Latinos in California following the passage of Proposition 187. These acts, especially when carried out or sanctioned by police officers, seemed to support a white supremacist notion of who constituted the public of, or who had a right to citizenship in, California and the U.S.A.

Tomás Almaguer (1994) has written about the white supremacist paradigm of the Lights on the Border program, in which citizens (symbolically “white”) were urged to park their cars and trucks in lines facing the Mexican side of the U.S.-Mexican border shining their bright white lights on it to prevent or discourage border crossing by those symbolically seen as non-white and the couriers of economic hardship for California. Members of the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps also took border policing into their own hands, reflecting the broader privatization logic of neoliberal capitalism.
Governor Pete Wilson urged the national passage of a corollary to Proposition 187 (Ono and Sloop 2002: 62), and similar bills were considered first in Texas, Florida, and Arizona (Ono and Sloop 2002: 4) – states also tending toward English-only initiatives. Recently, there have been more local and state ballot initiatives in Hazleton, Pennsylvania, Riverside, New Jersey, and most recently, in Arizona with the passage of State Senate Bill 1070, now the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act. Provisions of that act include enforcing trespassing charges against “illegal aliens” who are “present on any public or private land in this state” (Sec. 3, Title 13, Chapter 15) and providing “for any lawful contact made by a law enforcement official or agency of this state or a county, city, town or other political subdivision of this state where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States, a reasonable attempt shall be made, when practicable, to determine the immigration status of the person” (Sec. 2, Title 11, Chapter 8). Arizona Governor Janice Brewer issued a statement (http://azgovernor.gov/dms/upload/PR_042310_StatementByGovernorOnSB1070.pdf) on April 23, 2010, as she signed the bill into law, saying that it was necessary for Arizona to address a crisis “the federal government has refused to fix... the crisis caused by illegal immigration and Arizona’s porous border.” She stated that the bill would protect “all of us, every Arizona citizen and everyone here in our state lawfully.... We cannot delay while the destruction happening south of our international border creeps its way north.” Although Governor Brewer stated, in that same speech, “I will NOT tolerate racial discrimination or racial profiling in Arizona,” the passage of the bill had several immediate results that illustrated the political and cultural logic connecting the actual wording and implementation of legislation to larger debates and public anxieties. On the one hand, fears of racialized profiling and questioning of people with and without citizenship alike led to boycotting of a number of Arizona businesses, and comments in public discourse ranging from professional sports to the White House to late night television jokes. On the other, Republican State Representative Debbie Riddle, of Texas, announced plans to introduce a law similar to Arizona’s S. 1070 in the January 2011 Texas state legislative session. She had already introduced HB 49, titled “an act relating to the creation of the offense of criminal trespass by illegal aliens and to certain procedures for arresting illegal aliens suspected of committing criminal offenses,” in February 2009, but that bill had died in committee. Representative Riddle expressed hope that Arizona’s new Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act would encourage Texans to pass her similar bill into law. Archibold (2010) reported in the New York Times that in 2009 “there were a record number of laws enacted (222) and resolutions (131) in 48 states [related to immigration policy], according to the National Conference of State Legislatures.” Anthropological analysis of the texts of each these laws and resolutions and the different discourses and cultural logics within which they are situated would be useful. In the examples I have studied, there seems to be a cultural argument being made that increased surveillance of all the citizenry is justified to increase protection of “lawful citizens” from the criminality of “illegal
immigrants” (generally, for example, through trespassing or using public services without paying taxes, or argued in relation to specific killings in the U.S.-Mexico border region, etc.).

Not since the McCarthy era have we seen so much state-sponsored citizen surveillance in the U.S.A. (cf. Lind and Otenyo 2006). Although the rhetoric for the current surveillance is related to the events of September 11th, 2001 (cf. Haggerty and Gazso 2005), we can see continuity between the anti-immigrant discourse and practice supporting the passage of California Proposition 187 and more recent anti-immigrant legislation, and current anti-terrorist policies. Similarities include blurring constructions of race and nation in targeting individuals for state-sanctioned reductions of rights or for hate crimes by vigilantes, and a symbolic withdrawal from an inclusive national identity to an entrenched notion of the coextensiveness of full citizenship with whiteness. In both moments, “security” is discursively associated with this symbolic whiteness and blame and danger are associated with non-whiteness. We are back to Charles Mills’ racial contract.

Nativist appeals to anti-immigration legislation have waxed and waned with the economic and political tides in the U.S.A.. In the 1870s, for example, the U.S. was experiencing a severe economic depression (Zinn 1995: 240) in sync with a global recession. One response in the U.S. was to blame Asian immigrants for job shortages, and the Chinese Exclusion Act was passed in 1882 (Frank 1999: 74). After that act was passed, there were increased border patrols along both the U.S.-Canadian and U.S.-Mexican borders and pressure on those neighboring North American nations to adopt the same immigration policies as applied in the U.S. (Lee 2002). Over a century later, in 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Alien Responsibility Act was passed by the U.S. Congress and began another round of talks with representatives of the Canadian and Mexican governments on coordinating immigration controls. In 2002, there were very public protests in Canada about racial profiling in U.S. immigration practices.

How is “freedom from terrorism” being used to selectively invoke and ignore global citizens’ rights under international agreements? How is current U.S. immigration policy, as enforced by paid officials and by individuals acting out of ‘citizen watch’ entitlements, prone to privilege whiteness and stigmatize nonwhiteness to the point of stripping away citizenship rights because of racial profiling? Alejandro Portes argues (2003: 51): “While coping with the terrorist threat is an urgent concern, it should not derail us from the long-term priorities of the nation, or be used to justify chauvinism. An unfortunate consequence of this sense of national urgency is that the words ‘immigration’ and ‘terrorism’ are often joined in the same sentence, as if one necessarily led to the other.” Joanne Mariner (2003) discusses the increasingly discriminatory national regulation of citizenship status despite nations being signatory to the 1969 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Teresa Hayter (2000: 165) argues, “immigration controls are inherently racist.” Brian Keith Axel (2002) talks about the representation of diasporas as a “national interruption,” going along with the fantasy of homeland – as in the Homeland Security Act – and he suggests
that we view citizenship as a commodity. I would argue that market citizenship, like cultural citizenship, is a way to think about degrees of inclusion in the national public apart from legal status and that it is tied to moral and racializing arguments about whose free-marketeering status is merited and who is meant to serve the free-marketeering citizens as labor. If terrorism were the actual fear associated with non-citizenship, why would non-citizens be fighting in the U.S. military in Iraq, with the promise of a faster track to a green card? Like the wall, arguments about threats to security are largely symbolic and used to promote citizen surveillance of a shrinking default national citizenship. Legal status does not always matter at such moments, as Japanese Americans in California learned during their World War II internment.

Concluding strategies

Anthropology is well-equipped as a discipline, theoretically and methodologically, to situate anti-immigrant legislation in particular moments and places within broader contexts and cultural logics. In this article, for example, I have shown how California Proposition 187 – never intended by its proponents to be a lasting law, given its unconstitutionality – served as a focal point for a collection of fears about economic decline across the United States and a perception of diminishing political control by those racialized as white (who are often conflated with ‘U.S. citizens’ in public discourse and anti-immigration political advertisements). Activist anthropologists whose scholarship is informed by social justice concerns are inclined to ask what can be done about these dominant and arbitrarily racializing representations of new immigrants as threatening to personal, economic and national security. A number of useful suggestions have already been made. Otto Santa Ana, at the end of his book Brown Tide Rising: Metaphors of Latinos in Contemporary American Public Discourse (2002), suggests that we engage in a campaign of counter-metaphor: countering representations of immigrants as violating the national body, for example, with representations of immigrants as the lifeblood of the nation, necessary to its economic and cultural vitality. He suggests that rather than allowing disease metaphors to be used for new immigrants, we publicly call racism a cancer in the U.S. Racializing discourse about immigrants itself also introduces the possibility of transnational organizing against racialized discrimination (cf. Silverstein 2005: 377). As Silverstein (2005: 377) argues, it is our responsibility as scholars “to explore the cultural conditions of not just disjuncture and difference, but also of conjuncture and convergence.” Expanding on this, it is possible to see convergence not only between neoliberal and neoconservative agendas and white supremacist and anti-immigrant agendas, but also between social science research and social justice work. The hate crimes spurred by anti-immigrant discourse need to be understood not only in local contexts, but in national, transnational, historical, political, economic and cultural contexts, and anthropological analyses contribute usefully to such a project. Given (1) the current national economic downturn, (2) the highest regional rate in the country of recent immigration from Latin American nations, and (3) the new
immigration enforcement responsibilities of local sheriffs’ offices, for example, in communities where immigration-related legal and translation services may not be fully available, the current need for such anthropological analyses is particularly cogent in the U.S. South.

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The Merciful Executioner: Spectacles of Sexual Danger and National Reunification in the George Stinney Case, 1944

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The literal and metaphorical defining of postbellum America drew on a politics of exclusion, giving wider force to struggles over national identity and citizenship encoded by race, and inflected by sexual discourses. Despite emancipation claims, men of African descent were increasingly excluded from a citizenship based on notions of “whiteness,” and this was reflected in the shift from the spectacle of vigilante lynching to the spectacular trial. I use the case of George Stinney to illustrate how juridical law, like extra-legal lynching, affirmed a national identity articulated through the legitimation and restoration of white rule, perceived to be under threat. Convicted by an all-white jury of attempted rape and the murder of two white girls in South Carolina, 14-year-old George Stinney was the youngest person to be legally executed in America during the twentieth century. The hastily reached verdict was based solely on a confession obtained by two white police officers behind closed doors. Denied the right to appeal, Stinney would die soon after in a botched electrocution, too small to be properly strapped into the electric chair. The decision to legally execute him was informed by a series of interconnected ideas about sexuality, national danger, ‘civilization’ and ‘race,’ involving a nuanced set of reasons related to negotiations of national belonging through racialized alliances. The spectacle generated by this case indicates much about how white New South advocates construed national life and sought to construct a white ‘civilized’ collective identity, defending their region from Northern charges of Southern barbarism and asserting their place within the imperial politics of American nation building.

Consider, to begin, two racialized spectacles infused with nationalist scripts. Emmett Louis Till, a fourteen year-old Chicago boy on holiday in 1955, allegedly whistled at Carolyn Bryant on August 26th in a store in Mississippi where he had stopped with friends to buy candy. After midnight on August 27th, the woman’s husband and brother-in-law seized Till from his grandfather’s house and then
drove him to a plantation shed in a neighboring county where they tortured him to death. Two days later fishermen discovered the boy’s disfigured body in the Tallahatchie River, identifiable only by his father’s signet ring. Hastily acquitted by a jury of twelve, the two suspects, J.W. Milam and Roy Bryant later admitted to the murder under the protection of Constitutional double jeopardy preventing retrial. Their story, for which they were paid $4000, came out in the January 1956 issue of Look Magazine.

In 1944, just eleven years prior to Emmett Till’s murder, George Junius Stinney Jr., was convicted of the attempted rape and violent murder of two white girls, Betty June Binnicker, age 11, and Mary Emma Thames, age 8. The case of George Stinney is notable because he was just fourteen years of age (and possibly only thirteen) at the time of his execution, just finishing seventh grade at the time of his arrest (Bruck, 1985). Stinney held the notorious distinction of being the youngest person to be legally executed in America during the twentieth century.

Stinney’s family, convinced of his innocence, was driven out of town by a lynch mob. He was left to face his trial and execution alone. A search party found the girls’ bodies in a water-filled ditch near the Alderman Lumber Company, and autopsies revealed multiple blows to their skulls from a heavy, eleven-inch long railroad spike. There was no physical evidence (no blood on his shirt) or eyewitness testimony linking the boy to the crime, but two white police officers sought and quickly obtained his confession behind closed doors, and this would be successfully presented in court as the sole piece of evidence. In a spectacular trial attended by a crowd of 1500, an all-white jury reached a guilty verdict in less than ten minutes. No witnesses were called, and no evidence was presented on Stinney’s behalf. Denied the right to appeal, Stinney would die on June 16, 1944—just eighty-one days after his arrest—in a botched electrocution. At 90 pounds and 5’1” tall, he was too small to be properly strapped into the electric chair. Nor did the adult-sized facemask fit Stinney, slipping free to expose his convulsing, terrified face to witnesses (James 2002, Cato 2003, Bruck 1985).

We have, then, two different penal styles punishing the alleged violation of “southern white womanhood”: a case of vigilante torture and murder, and a legal execution. These different punishments, administered within eleven years of each other in two southern states, represent a methodological shift in penal justice that reflected wider processes of national identity formation in the American South. The southern move from lynching spectacles to a demonstrated adherence to modern juridical law during the first half of the twentieth century was a specifically nationalist demonstration of Eurocentric “civilized” status, an effort on the part of disparate groups of white southerners to join up with the North. While the rape-lynch syndrome was steeped in nationalist ideals, lawful juridical reforms would ostensibly civilize punishment, introducing the electric chair as a more humane and expedient way of putting prisoners to death.

This spectacle of rational self-control in adoption of juridical forms of punishment for the “violation of white womanhood” also signaled a wider process of national reunification defined by whiteness. White Americanism, discursively constructed by civilizationist rhetoric, the human sciences and Eurocentric
colonial discourses, influenced the question of punishment as a specific expression of national identity. Punishment relates to national identity formation because decisions of whether to execute or commute express the wider politics of rule; such judgments convey public hopes and anxieties as well as socio-political identities through which people define ethnic boundaries—or themselves, as a certain kind of people (Garland 1990: 19; Hay 1996: vii; Strange 1996: 5, 131).

Stinney’s execution represents both a contribution to the legitimization of juridical law as an expression of American “civilization” and an example of how the rejection of chivalric lynching was made palatable for much of white popular culture in the American South in 1944 through the venue of a theatrical spectacle, a show trial. The case demonstrated a white supremacy that was masked and thereby reinforced by modern methods offered by rational and seemingly blind justice.

Arguing against capital punishment for juvenile offenders, criminal lawyer David Bruck (1984) suggests that Stinney’s execution was accidental; a case that simply fell though the cracks of jurisprudence. The execution of an adolescent, he argues, was a punishment that would have seemed cruel by the national mores of the day. Just prior to the Stinney case in Parris Island, S.C., a sixteen-year-old white boy was convicted of the rape and murder of a white child, yet protected from the electric chair, receiving a relatively lenient prison sentence. I contend that far from being rife with errors, the Stinney case actually expressed the socio-political values and identities of the juridical actors and sectors of white popular culture. These values articulated the racialization of national identity as connected to mercy and the shift from vigilante to juridical law in the American South.

Structures of cultural power

David Bruck (1984) contends that “what happened to Stinney” was not monstrous and exemplary of “Old South judicial mores” or the “brutality of old-fashioned Jim Crow justice.” Echoing typically northern responses to lynching before it was publicly deemed barbaric, Bruck defends Stinney’s executioners as “ordinary people reacting to a horrible crime: Their sympathies lay with the victims and the grief-stricken parents rather than with the killer.” Some forty years later, Bruck interviewed the foreperson of the jury, who argued “an overly lenient judicial system might have released him after a few years to commit more crimes.” No similar concern is expressed over the concurrent Parris Island case in which a white sixteen-year-old boy convicted of the rape and murder of a small child was extended juridical mercy and protected from the electric chair. Nor does Bruck see fit to divulge horrifying details of the white boy’s case as he does with Stinney’s. Moreover, he declines to question the dubious method used to obtain Stinney’s “confession” to the crime luridly described as “bashing in the heads of two small white girls, aged 11 and 8, in the course of an unsuccessful attempt to rape one of them.” Presumptions solidly ensconced, Bruck proceeds to argue for protection of juvenile offenders through the reformation of the death penalty.

Bruck’s argument is interesting for his perhaps inadvertent observation that punishment reveals more about collective self-identity than the crime or the offender, who is cast as a pawn within wider power relations:
So it may soon be time to consider the lesson revealed by the pathetic spectacle of George Stinney’s death. The lesson is simply this: A decent society places certain absolute limits on the punishments that it inflicts—no matter how terrible the crime or how great the desire for retribution. And one of those limits is that it does not execute people for crimes committed while they were children. The reason for this does not come from any misplaced sentimentality about the innocence of youth. The reason is simply that such restraint is required by our own self-respect. (Bruck 1984)

Bruck’s central argument then, is that despite Stinney’s presumed culpability, we should not execute the young—even for heinous crimes—because it reflects badly on us as a “decent” society.

Consideration of wider negotiations of national identity can shed light on the Stinney case and the attendant question of why, since the time of Radical Reconstruction, moral panics over the mythical “Black Rapist” have often gone unchallenged. Observing how ethnicity, race, and nation work, Stuart Hall argues that nationalism “creates, reflects and reproduces structures of cultural power” (O’Leary 1999: 4). Judgments, including those extending mercy to children in the mid-twentieth century U.S., are complex political acts involving political agendas (but not conspiracies) beyond the stated sentimental concern for children. The Stinney case must be examined as a product of the surrounding political culture of the time (one that increasingly rejected honor-based, chivalric lynchings in favor of juridical punishment, including legal executions), with consideration to a complex set of interrelated reasons related to negotiations of national identity that extended globally in binary modernist narratives about “civilization” vs. “barbarism.” It seems unlikely that George Stinney “fell through the cracks” of the prison system, especially given that court officials took such care to smuggle him out of the county, protecting him from a lynch mob of merchants and lumber-mill workers. The development and outcome of the Stinney case was a product of wider historical, political and socioeconomic processes; to a discussion of these, I now turn.

**Failed nationalism**

As the imperial unknown, colonized land was often feminized, with female icons —Anne McClintock (1995:24) calls them fetishes—placed at contact zones as threshold figures or boundary markers. Sailors once baptized their ships with feminine names and placed female mastheads on them as threshold objects. Cartographers marked unknown areas of the globe with mermaids and sirens. Explorers’ travelogues describe invasions of “virgin lands,” penetrating territories unknown to them and violently conquering them as a matter of natural gender hierarchy (ibid.:26-27). Writing about the European conquest of America in 1492, Samuel Eliot Morison mused,

> Never again may mortal men hope to recapture the amazement, the wonder, the delight of those October days in 1492 when the New World
gracefully yielded her virginity to the conquering Castilians. (Montrose 1991:12)

While patriarchal ambivalence toward women has historically denied them any direct national agency, they have participated as metaphoric bearers of nation, represented in feminine iconography such as Liberty, Germania, and Britannia (Berlant 1991: 30-35). Northern invasion during the Civil War devastated the South economically and politically, and Confederate defeat signaled a failed nationalism that became sexualized, with nationhood standing for manly virtue and protection. Feminizing the South, army lore interpreted reconciliation as “the metaphorical reunion of a Northern Captain and his Southern wife” (O’Leary 1999: 116). Southern clergy, promoting a certain brand of “manly Christianity” declared that “a people’s manhood” was its most valuable possession: a strong nation required chastity and selflessness from its women, and white men were needed as virtuous if virile moral protectors of womanhood. Rebecca Lee, who would become the first female American senator, commended the Confederate soldiers for the protection they extended the South from Yankee “soldiers that outraged Southern women” (Wilson 1980: 47). Federal “interference,” involving promises of political and economic empowerment to former slaves through emancipation, exacerbated the national emasculation and economic ruin many white southerners experienced with Civil War defeat. The South was maligned as socially inferior, “uncivilized;” “a cultural Sahara,” and it struggled with northern economic exploitation and semi-colonial status well into the twentieth century (Tindall 1967: 433-472, 575; Green 1969: 292; McWilliams 1988: 89-99,137-8).

Displacing their resentment towards Union forces and shame of feminization onto various groups of racialized “others,” some whites claimed that the most important effect of the Confederate loss was to unshackle men of African descent to lust after “the Paradise tree of the forbidden fruit—the white women beyond their reach” (Wilson 1980: 46-47). While leaving intact local authority to make color and race distinctions, the 14th (1868) and 15th (1870) Amendments to the Constitution established certain civil rights protections regardless of race, recognizing the rights of black men to vote and to participate in government, and enforcing this through the federally imposed Freedman’s Bureau, which maintained southern courts from 1865 to 1868 (Roediger 2008: 120). Black enfranchisement, interpreted as “Negro Domination” by some, invoked a chivalric response by Klan-based guerilla organizations (Brundage 1993:171). I have argued elsewhere (Bickford 2007:449) that the postbellum southern rape-lynch syndrome emerged as a white reaction to black male suffrage, interpreted by many as a violation of the (feminized) nation. Voting was a masculinized act, and some whites expressed concern that voting made a man of African descent “feel his manhood, which in the eyes of the white man, is asking too much” (Hodes 1993: 405). Captured in the myth of the animalized “Black Fiend,” the black vote signified the rape of “the virgin whiteness” of the South. If Confederate soldiers had failed in their role as protectors of the “snow-white citadel” of the South—their women and their civilization—now, in the face of perceived “Negro Colonization,” they saw a new opportunity to guard it through
the prevention of alleged black assaults on white women in their iconographic role as National Symbolic. In the immediate postbellum period a small group of aristocratic Confederate veterans established the first wave of the chivalric Ku Klux Klan in Tennessee, as the mystical wing of the Lost Cause movement. Such vigilante organizations melded Christianity and Confederate nationalism in their extra-legal resistance to northern political interference and the mythical “black peril.” Lynching was a common southern white response to political participation, labour disputes or petty crime by men of African descent, but mobs, preoccupied with fears of national violation, increasingly attributed their vengeance to the imagined sexual assault of white virgins (Roediger 2008: 115). The imagined dishonor of white womanhood implied national violation and an “encroachment on the Anglo Saxon male right to everything in American society and civilization” (Gunning 1996: 7).

Postbellum moral panics over black on white rape conveyed regional anxieties about national unity, emancipation and enfranchisement. White apprehension over interracial sexuality has predictably attended threats to national cohesion, and reassertions of racial difference have historically generated white nationalistic rhetoric. Accusations of sexual threat that were unmotivated by actual sexual assaults were, as Stoler (1997: 353) argues, tied to crises of control, whether those were border transgressions or threats from within to the consensus of white communities. Sander Gilman (1985: 346) notes that hypersexuality, commonly attributed to marginalized groups, “is the most salient marker of Otherness, organically representing a racial difference.” Persistent civilizationist rhetoric and popular imperialism reflected fears of the “other” within the nation, and once all of this was imbricated with black political agency (along with southern economic exigencies that reunification could address), presumptions of deviant hypersexuality abounded, resulting in fears of widespread debauchery, criminality and national danger. Thus, evolving national discourses on multiracial American society during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries not only associated deviant sexuality with disease and racial degenerative relapse, but also with criminality (Gilman 1990:240; Butler 1993). Many southern whites attributed “widespread criminality, debauchery, and contagion” to youths who by the 1890s had grown up in the postbellum period outside the confines of slavery (Gunning 1996:25). Norms of racial etiquette began to unravel with black refusals of racial subjugation and whites popularly interpreted this stance as criminal (Ayers 1984: 234). Reconstruction newspaper editorials complained that it was “...almost impossible to walk the streets without meeting some negro with a segar [sic] stuck in his mouth, puffing its smoke in the faces of persons passing” (quoted in Ayers 1984: 149).

Reconciliation

Developing between the Civil War and World War I, North-South reconciliation increasingly drew upon a racialized alliance that provided a critical space for consolidating various groups of whites (Tindall 1967: 152-6; O’Leary 1999:111).
The South was anything but homogeneous, and despite the American rhetoric of “one people,” national discourses of reunification were socially, linguistically and culturally disparate, uncoordinated and contradictory (O’Leary 1999: 4, 12, 49-57, 121-124). A multiplicity of voices—black and white veterans, northern and southern veterans, modernist and anti-modernists, black and white women’s groups, freed people, labour organizations, black and white supporters of Racial Reconstruction, and so on—competed to define America though issues ranging from white supremacy and the racialization of patriotism, militarism, imperialism, and regional autonomy, to social justice, including the realization of democracy and racial equality (ibid.:6). Southerners of African descent were never more patriotic than during Radical Reconstruction; but national identity would be deeply defined through a white racial alliance, overwhelming the legacy of Emancipation.

During World War I and for a decade thereafter, calls for white supremacy and militaristic “protection,” along with the provision of common racial enemies for northern and southern white imperialists muffled demands for social equality in defining national memory (O’Leary 1999:239-242). Nationalism is imbricated with structures of cultural power internalized and sustained by collective memory, itself a contested process that must find some common denominator as a basis for unification (Applegate 1990:5-9). Confino (1997:4) notes that national exclusion of other nations brings some measure of collective identity to disparate groups, sometimes to the point of downplaying various structural inequalities. America came to be unified on the basis of a white racial alliance.

Two years before issuing the Emancipation Proclamation (1863), Abraham Lincoln chose not to impede the “institution of slavery in the US where it exist[ed]” (O’Leary 1999: 25). Military exigency forced his hand, because Union victory required abolition (ibid.). While Lincoln thereby alluded to a link between emancipation and the Civil War, the North’s overriding mission was to preserve the Union, and this directive continued at the end of the Civil War.

Southern Democrats effectively linked their support of national goals of imperial expansion, national unification and economic modernization with demands for the removal of Federal troops from the South, and 1877 brought national abandonment of Reconstruction. This racial alliance was pivotal to reconciliation, because defeat had been initially associated with Emancipation and Southern white loss of racial control. In 1896 the Supreme Court would uphold the introduction of segregation (O’Leary 1999:114-115).

Louis Aggasiz argued for the limitation of social privilege for people of African descent because “No man has a right to what he is unfit to use” (Gould 1992: 98). Freedoms won in the first three decades following the Civil War came under attack in the late 1890s, and by the turn of the century, disfranchisement effectively followed intensified depictions of men of African descent as hypersexual beasts or as children, incapable of casting anything more than an “ignorant vote” (Nathans 1983:80-2). By 1920, blacks disappeared from juries and public office and only a third of farmers owned land, and only on the poorest soil. Most were sharecroppers and tenants, the conditions of their existence replicating those under slavery.
Additionally, southern white soldiers were invited to join national ventures of popular imperialism and masculine militarism, fighting perceived danger of the “other” through the militaristic subjugation of the Plains Indians. This provided a structural basis for the ideological alliance of white supremacists in the South and northern pride in the might of the Union. By 1890, the combination of industrialization and capitalist expansion with American military victories in the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Indian wars, and the Spanish-American War had mobilized the Union as a strong continental power (McClintock 1995: 5; Wilson 1980: 47; O’Leary 1999: 4, 116, 142-6, 221; Green 1969: 291).

National identity had also been developing in late nineteenth century within the context of the New South movement, under the auspices of coalitions of nascent white middle class forces led by disparate groups who sought to “bring progressive change to their defeated region” (O’Leary 1999: 5; McWilliams 1988: 9-10). Regional underdevelopment would drive New South advocates to seek national belonging with hopes of eventually sharing in national wealth, but reunification remained deeply influenced by the promise of white Southern Eurocentric status under popular imperialism as a “civilized” people. In the early decades of the twentieth century their participation in national imperial projects was legitimized as a civilizing process, as was their increased support of juridical law over vigilantism. While lynching reached unprecedented levels between 1890 and 1930, it increasingly lost favor amongst these supporters who at least publicly supported only legal justice (Ayers 1984: 246-7).

Revolt against chivalry: juridical law over vigilantism

The shift from lynching spectacles to the spectacular juridical trial is hardly indicative of an antiracist epiphany, but instead underscores some of the concerns of various sectors of southern whites about their regional reputation on the national stage, damaged by the recent history of slavery and the brutally exploitative but lucrative convict-lease system that succeeded it, regional underdevelopment, child labour practices, and archaic penal practices such as lynching spectacles.

Many northern whites popularly if tacitly approved of the rape-lynch syndrome for a time, the projected image of endangered white womanhood ostensibly justifying white on black violence. But popular discourses would shift, gradually rejecting southern lynching on the basis of three central concerns that would trouble equations of northern abolitionism with antiracism. First, as an act of lawlessness, many northerners opposed lynching not because of its terrorism against people of African descent—in fact, modern racism harnessed itself to progressive projects—but because it was a lawless act of revolt directed against the Federal government. At the turn of the century, a northern newspaper suggested that a “want of respect for law was the evil that afflicts the South – and the United States.” In 1930,

southern white activist Jessie Daniel Ames founded the Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching, “against the ‘crown of chivalry which has been pressed like a crown of thorns on our heads’” (Hall 1993: 167). Never challenging the accuracy of the “Black Rapist” stereotype, Ames lobbied for legal protection of white womanhood, rather than chivalric vigilantism, which placed protective sanctions on white women’s behavior, and was grounded in violent, “savage lawlessness” and vengeful rituals performed in their name (O’Brien 1999: 109; Hall 1979:111-116). Francis Willard of the Women’s Christian Temperance Union publicly sympathized with southern white supremacists but insisted that “no crime however heinous can by any possibility excuse the commission of any act of cruelty or the taking of any human life without due course of law” (Gunning 1996:109). While Chicago social worker Jane Addams believed that there was “a peculiar class of crime committed by one race against another,” she argued that “the bestial in man, that which leads him to pillage and rape, can never be controlled by public cruelty and dramatic punishment, which too often cover fury and revenge” (Chesnutt 2002: 384).

Secondly, in keeping with civilizationist rhetoric of imperial ascendency, the white racial episteme incorporated colonial tropes of animalization and infantilization at home and abroad, making binary epistemological distinctions between modern and anti-modern, “civilized” and “barbaric” lands (Latour 1993: 47-48). Lynching increasingly cast a negative light on a region of Americans wishing to disassociate themselves from the “savagery” embodied by the mythical “Black Rapist.” Self-identified “progressive,” middle class white southerners, wishing to shed their reputed atavism to present a “civilized” countenance for the nation and the world, rejected lynching, at least partly to assert their civilized ethnicity within civil nationalist politics of imperialism. By 1922, members of a social welfare agency, the North Carolina Conference for Social Service, denounced it:

Lynching occurs nowhere else, not even among the savages whom we are seeking to Christianise”...”This crime of crimes, which is not only a complete subversion of law, but a stroke at the very life of law itself, has discredited our nation in the eyes of other civilised nations (1922)”...”Stories of American mobs burning human beings at the stake and exulting in their torture are regularly published throughout Europe, in Latin America, in the Orient, and even in Africa. The effect in mission lands can easily be imagined.2

Third, the initially romanticized vision of Klansmen as dispossessed aristocratic protectors fell into decline as the image shifted to one of mob rule, a lawless and “savage” pastime of “hot-headed rednecks.” The old aristocratic vision of honor increasingly became adopted by various groups of poor whites, evidenced by the second wave of the Ku Klux Klan, which had initially excluded them from

membership (Wilson 1980:100-101). As a class-based ritual, lynching came to be discursively defined as a disorganizing principle that threatened national integrity. Popular rhetoric increasingly assumed a working class tendency toward “pigheaded and brutish criminality,” in keeping with its an affinity with nature and dark passions, as opposed to the rationality associated with modern culture (Fraser 1982: 143-44). While the “Black Fiend” became a symbol of social disorder against which all whites could unite for national renewal, by the 1940s, the methods of dealing with it would undergo a class-based shift to juridical law. The Richmond Times argued, “We cannot serve two masters. Either the law or the mob must rule, and if we are to have mob rule, then let us abolish the law altogether” (Brundage 1993: 172).

Sensitive to northern charges of southern barbarism, white middle class proponents of the New South movement sought to demonstrate their affiliation with the globally powerful American nation through a rejection of lynching. In keeping with Grace E. Hale’s (1998) Making Whiteness and Gail Bederman’s (1995) Manliness & Civilization, Lisa Dorr (2004) claims that lynching was modern because it incorporated stylized public spectacle and self-control rather than simple retributive justice. But as Foucault (1995) argues, stylized structure also marked torture spectacles of the ancient regime. While the nascent white middle class saw a clean break with the past, much of the old was reinscribed in or coexisted with multiple, small changes. The romanticism of the old aristocracy was exhumed and admired, now, even by the working class, and even as many aristocratic values came to be rejected by the emergent bourgeoisie. Mark Twain saw the paradox as “practical common-sense, progressive ideas and progressive works, mixed up with the duel, the inflated speech, and the jejune romanticism of an absurd past that is dead” (Woodward 1971: 153). Here, and in keeping with Foucault, one can see no historical discontinuities, no break; but a recuperation of older discourses, which are recovered and modified into new forms, allowing for the perpetuation of old biases (Stoler 1995: 61, 72).

In 1930, fourteen years prior to the Stinney case, Oliver Moore was seized from a North Carolina county jail by a mob of white men and murdered in a highly publicized lynching (Raper 2003: 210). Moore’s murder was salient as a “surprise sortie against law, order and civilization” (ibid.: 117), and the governor declared that the guilty parties would be brought to justice for bringing disgrace to the state, but local officials and white citizens tacitly accepted the incident as “legally awful, personally admirable,” and the perpetrators proceeded with virtual immunity (ibid.:117-118). Editorials in large daily newspapers expressed concern over outside criticism and “the State’s Shame” in this “reversion to the primitive in man” (ibid.: 112, 117). One court official commented, “I hate that this thing occurred on account of the criticism it has brought” (ibid.: 118). White southerners could no longer legitimately protect their national territory (sacralized as vulnerable and virginal) through lynching; legal protection was encouraged while racist discourses remained intact.

Brutal punishments make a brutal people

It was important for southern groups of “progressives” to abide by the law as a matter of national belonging in a civilized nation. But some white supremacists argued that the secular law was too good for people of African descent, who would presumably enjoy the pomp and ceremony of a formal trial before a judge. Advocating the “Organic Law of the Land,” these whites claimed, “the great problem of the destiny of the negro upon this continent can never be solved by the strong arm of the law” (Ayers 1984:155). They further argued,

> Political equality breeds ambition for social equality, with its train of evils which no one can understand or fully appreciate who has not lived in the midst of these unfortunate derelicts of Fate and Nature. The Negro thus asserts himself, and his sense of his own importance, which was quiescent and pacific so long as he was kept in political and social subordination, becomes often offensively and insolently inflated (ibid.: 239).

In a speech before the U.S. Senate in 1907, South Carolina’s Ben Tillman railed against juridical law for rape charges involving men of African descent:

> And shall such a creature...appeal to the law? Shall men cold bloodedly stand up and demand for him the right to have a fair trial and be punished in the regular course of justice? So far as I am concerned he has put himself outside the pale of the law, human and divine....Civilisation peels off us, any and all of us who are men, and we revert to the original savage type whose impulses under any and all circumstances has always been to “kill! kill! kill!” (Chase and Collier 1970:182)

While vigilante mobs performed spectacular ritual lynchings, juridical administrators often performed “legal lynchings,” which Jessie Daniel Ames declared, “rocked the foundations of American democracy” (Hall 1993:200):

> The jury sitting within the court room hearing the evidence but listening to the noise of the rioters, trying to render a “fair and impartial” verdict guaranteed by the Constitution to every American citizen regardless of race, yet sensing the restive stirring of the human mass gone mad, knowing that the shouts of gratified passion greeting each sentence of death will be turned into snarls of rage against them if they interpret the evidence contrary to the verdict of the mob. (Hall 1979: 200)

The George Stinney spectacle

The open-and-shut nature of the Stinney case demonstrated to skeptical southern whites that juridical law could actually furnish an effective alternative to vigilantism. It would punish the prisoner while retaining the spectacular mood of public lynching, albeit with a shift in focus to the trial from the execution. While this would require a new show of restraint, it would be all the more commendable in the face of the particular dishonor allegedly visited on “southern womanhood” by “the Black Fiend.” What many advocates of lynch law doubted was the capacity of legal justice to resolve honor-based infractions in a swift and retributive manner.
Rule of law adopted a slower process of justice for a weighing of all evidence in a systematic and impartial manner (Blee 1991: 12). The most popular suggestion for the prevention of lynching was the increased efficiency of the formal justice system, thereby substituting “orderly procedure for private passion and revengeful force” (Ayers 1984: 246-7). An 1884 newspaper editorial suggested making it:
...obligatory on the judge of the court to having jurisdiction, to convene his court, as soon as possible after the commission of the crime, in special session to try the accused and upon conviction let the criminal be executed instantly...Then will the people be spared the temptation - the almost necessity - of staining their hands in extra-judicial, though most foul blood. (Ayers 1984: 246-7)

George Stinney’s case demonstrated how expeditious judicial law could be. Based upon a confession taken from the boy within an hour by two white police officers, the defense counsel decided not to request a psychiatric evaluation. Stinney was brought back to stand trial on April 24, 1944, within a month of his arrest. A jury of twelve white men was picked before noon, and testimony commenced at 2:30 p.m. By mid-afternoon, the entire case had been presented, and after ten minutes’ deliberation, the jury returned with its verdict of guilty with no recommendation of mercy (Bruck 1985).

During the 1930s and 1940s, judges wielded enormous discretionary power, even to the point of sentencing convicted murderers to probation. This led to a wide spectrum in sentencing, where the outcome of a case had everything to do with the judge’s political stance. Moreover, the filing of a one-sentence notice of appeal would have automatically have stayed Stinney’s execution date for at least one year, but Charles Plowden, the boy’s court-appointed lawyer, failed to inform him or his parents (who were, in any case, run out of town by a lynch mob) of his right to appeal. Plowden was a young and fledgling politician facing a primary election fight that July. He recalled in a 1983 interview that the family would have had no money to pay for an appeal (Bruck 1985).

As a modern-day spectacle, this show trial was infused with nationalist scripts—discourses of sexual danger, “race” and “civilization.” After the trial, the Associated Press ran a story of the impending execution, and Governor Olin Johnson received several hundred letters and telegrams from individuals in South Carolina the rest of the country, as well as from local NAACP chapters, labour unions and ministers’ associations. Some implored him to issue an order of clemency commuting the sentence to life imprisonment—one telegram read, “Child execution is only for Hitler”—but many others from around the South applauded the Governor’s announced intention to let the execution proceed. E.P. Thomas of Austin, Texas wired “Sure glad to hear of your decision regarding Nigger Stinney.” The Governor, facing a difficult primary election in July 1944, would not challenge the sentence because “any hint of vacillation on the racial issue could be costly” (Bruck 1985).

Racialized considerations made the ruling a political act of southern alignment with the judicial mores of the North and were ultimately not disadvantageous from the perspective of a region where Americans wished to present a “civilized”
countenance for the nation and the world at large. While a resident of Atlanta expressed concern that the “whole nation would be shocked by execution of child,” in fact, “the nation scarcely noticed” (Bruck 1984).

**Current implications**

This critical legal history relates to current problems in criminal justice in the context of the current racialized legalities and economy of the prison industrial complex of super-incarceration. We still construct the racialized, animalized and monstrous “other,” finding new ways and in certain respects, reinscribing old methods by which we dispose of them.

Observing that racism and white supremacy have survived the emancipation proclamation, the Civil Rights Movement, and various other events that should have brought post-racialism, David Roediger (2009) observes that in contemporary American popular culture “racism turns on this view of bad, but disappearing individual attitude.” But racism is not just a matter of personal disdain based on perceived differences, or an off-shoot of state formation; nor is it a scapegoat reaction to economic crises, or an offshoot of state formation; nor is it a scapegoat reaction to economic crises, nor is it a scapegoat reaction to economic crises. Rather than seeing racism as an incongruous repercussion, Foucault views it more in terms of excess of biopower, as integral to bourgeois liberalism and the modern normalizing state in its role as biological protector of the body politic. A series of new laws in the second half of the seventeenth century made distinctions between black and white, regulated marriage, and naturalized a system in which descent (freedom or slavery) ran through the mother’s line (Stoler 1995: 68-69; Roediger 2008; Harris 1993: 1719-1720; Katz 1962: 279).

America currently has less than five percent of the world’s population, but houses over twenty percent of its inmates. 1.5 to two million people currently inhabit American prisons, jails, immigrant detention centers and youth facilities—four times as many as in 1970 (Christie 2000:12; Cayley 1998: 4; Davis 2003: 92). The total number bound in the criminal justice system, including those on probation, awaiting trial, or on parole, equals more than 5 million (Cayley 1998: 4). Paul Butler (1995) likens America to a police state, wherein more black youth go to prison than college, two thirds of them being arrested before reaching the age of thirty. In America in 1995, one third of all black men in their twenties were entangled in the criminal justice system. In 1991, more than forty percent of black male residents of Washington D.C. between eighteen and thirty-five were under

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5 Scapegoat interpretations argue that to deflect anxieties in times of social and economic strife, racialized subpopulations are marginalized—and in this case, lynched. In analyses of the southern rape-lynch syndrome, for instance, some posit that vigilante mob rule was a response to economic downturns; by making statistical correlations between high rates of lynching and periods of declining cotton prices, or summertime increases in demands for farm labour (Kousser and Griffin 1998: 172).
criminal justice supervision, and in the same year in Baltimore, the figure rose to fifty-six percent. Based on single day counts, these surveys indicate a lifetime risk of arrest at eighty to ninety percent for young black men living in urban areas of the U.S. (Cayley 1998:25-26).

Malcolm and Feeley (1992) contest the common assumption that a rise in crime has caused the massive increases in prison populations. The politics of punishment are such that the prison industrial complex has been fueled by racism and privatization patterns. Since the early 1980s, a new social order has been emergent with the development of global capitalism, characterized by economic changes that “shook the postwar welfare state to its foundation” (Cayley 1992: 21-22). The shrinking state has been accompanied by high unemployment, war on drugs initiatives, and rising levels of imprisonment, in turn attended by increasing polarization in wealth distribution, deregulation, and free-market fundamentalism or libertarian capitalism, absolved from constraints and local loyalties.

Criminal behavior is correlated with poverty, but rejecting the recommendations of Lyndon Johnson’s 1967 commission to attempt to ameliorate economic conditions that drive individuals to crime, governments since 1970 have instead declared a “war on crime” (Cayley 1992: 18, 21-22). Global capitalism has brought a massive surge of corporate capital into the prison economy, attended by a burgeoning prison population since the early 1980s—and a falling crime rate (Davis 2003: 92-93; Cayle 1998:5). In the U.S., the crime rate has decreased for decades, without a corresponding abatement in prison population growth. The ways in which crimes are punished, and trends in who is targeted for punishment (petty as opposed to white-collar crime), depends on police practices, legislative enactments, decisions of judges and parole boards, media biases and the wider social context (Cayley 1998: 6). Private business has a vested interest in the perpetuation of the prison industrial complex, filling prisons and retaining prisoners as long as possible (Davis 2003: 95). Discourses of recidivism have changed, where high rates of returns to prison “once indicated program failure; now they are offered as efficiency and effectiveness of parole as a control apparatus” (Feeley and Simon 1992: 455). Corporations benefit from this exploitation of labor unattended by strikes, benefits, or union organizing (Davis 2003: 84, 95). The “New leviathan prisons are being built on thousands of eerie acres of factories inside the walls” (ibid.: 84). Three strikes law, mandatory minimum sentences (plagued by systematic racism), and determinate sentencing draw increasing numbers of people into the criminal justice system (Mirza 2001: 492-493). Politicians benefit from prison labor because it lowers official unemployment figures and indicates that “something has been done” in response to media generated moral panics, which promote social solidarity by targeting the “othered.” The “other,” stigmatized by media surveillance and spectacle, is juxtaposed with law-abiding citizens in a binary of good vs. bad (Cayley 1998: 8, 29-30).

Crime control has become an industry with the commoditization and commercialization of prisons. The result is a broadening of definitions of criminality—with the War on Drugs—and a concomitant inflation of crime,
exacerbated by visual media sensationalism (Feeley and Simon 1992: 461; Cayley 1998:23). Prisons no longer even pretend to rehabilitate prisoners. Since the early 1980s, prisons have rejected reformation as a goal, functioning instead as a custodial option (Feeley and Simon 1992: 460-461). Mass incarceration generates an ever-increasing gap between the rich and the poor, leading to more crime and more imprisonment. Prisons are expensive, they fail to deter, and they create desperate offenders, publically feared for their potential collective insurrection. Treated as high-risk group, they are managed for the “protection of society” (Feeley and Simon 1992: 467). We now segregate and simply contain “the criminal,” vilifying, surveilling and managing intractable groups (ibid.: 469; Cayley 1998: 41-42). The prison industrial complex takes the focus off the chief causes of criminality—global capitalism, neo-colonialism and unequal wealth distribution—warehousing the “othered” and affirming the social value of those who have prospered in the new economic order (Cayley 1998: 8, 30). Since 1975, policies from many countries reflect a shift from the culpability of society to the guilt of the offender, and from rehabilitation to retribution (ibid.: 41-42).

The current justice system is based on profit, retribution and vengeance rather than reparation and reconciliation (Davis 2003: 85), despite the fact that rehabilitation is very often possible through community based sanctions—where acknowledgement is given to victims, offenders take responsibility, and they make reparations, rather than taking no responsibility as they passively get processed through the mainstream criminal justice system. Restorative justice programs have produced “dramatic decreases in the frequency and seriousness of criminal behaviour,” leading us to ask whether the current justice system seeks profit and retribution over peacemaking (Cayley 1998:10-11). Alternative justice is often ignored or bypassed, as prisons continue to expand, enabling the exploitation of labour in “correctional” facilities. The concept of an underclass—with its connotation of permanent exclusion from social mobility for whole portions of the population without literacy or skills—has laid the groundwork for a strategic field that emphasizes low-cost management of an “unredeemable” group that can only be dealt with through “a kind of waste management function.” (Feeley and Simon 1992:468-470).

At the 2001 United Nations World Conference Against Racism, some argued that the expanding system of prisons worldwide exacerbates racism, though many proponents insist it is race-neutral (Davis 2003: 85-86). The War on Drugs declared by Nixon in 1970 arguably constituted a covert waging of war on black America, given the conspicuous racial pattern in convictions. Blacks have been historically overrepresented in prisons; their proportion in prisons during the 1920s was double their representation in the general population. Figures from the early 1990s show that twelve percent of the American population was black, and the frequency with which blacks and whites used illegal drugs was comparable; but blacks received seventy-four percent of convictions for drug crime in 1992 and 1993. Hispanics and blacks combined accounted for ninety percent of prison sentences (Cayley 1998: 21-22, 24-26).
Cayley (1998:6) recalls, “A prisoner, as the U.S. Supreme Court asserted in 1871, ‘is for the time being a slave of the state.’” Exacerbating racial polarization, surveillance and racial profiling of mostly black and Hispanic individuals living in concentrated zones of poverty, the prison industrial complex provides “a dumping ground for unwanted people” (Feeley and Simon 1992: 467-468; Cayley 1998: 3, 30). Prisons provide an endless supply of cheap, forced labour of racialized “others.”

Davis (2003:93-95) argues that the new supply of free black labourers within the current prison industrial complex reinscribes historical southern racial and economic relationships, suggesting,

…it is clear that black bodies are considered dispensable within the “free world” but as a major source of profit in the prison world...In arrangements reminiscent the postbellum convict lease system, county, state and federal governments are charged a fee by private companies for each inmate. (95)

In the postbellum era, when slavery could no longer be relied upon, the penal population became disproportionately black and private agents used convict lease and chain gang labour (ibid.: 94-95). Today, the racial makeup of the U.S. prison population approaches these historical proportions, and the privatization of the old convict lease system is reinscribed in contemporary, profit-driven prisons (ibid.:95).

The current penal and criminal justice state of affairs figures in the historical trajectory I have described from extralegal lynching as “barbarism” to juridical trials as “civilization.” The ways we punish convey much about “us” as “a certain kind of people” and critical criminologists, among others, effectively appeal to us by commenting on what the current prison industrial complex says about us in terms of our enlightened, “civilized” status. Nils Christie, for instance, suggests, “counter-forces in morality” (Christie 2000: 13) and “the social production of moral indifference” (Cayley 1998:16-17). Feeley and Simon (1992: 470) express concern that “this kind of reversion is likely to be fatal to a democratic civil order” because imprisonment monopolizes criminal justice, normalizing totalitarianism (Christie 2000:14). Prisons by definition are totalitarian institutions, acclimatizing the societies that increasingly rely on them. Many countries employing the new penology show a “dulled” sensitivity to suffering and a “weakened resistance” to imposing suffering. (Cayley 1998: 6-7). Cayley (ibid.: 7) notes, “the utilitarian political theory that underwrote the development of the modern prison saw the institution as a humane limitation on punishment” as a “deliberate and measured infliction of pain on a person.” Jeremy Bentham wrote that punishment “was a necessary evil ... which ought to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil” (quoted in Cayley 1998: 7). Cayley points to the question of what kind of people we have become in his cogent observation,

Today when crime is discussed, there is often a tang of brimstone in the air, and a disturbing enthusiasm for the expansion of penal control, as if punishment were no longer a necessary evil, but had become a desired
good...Crime control has become a self-justifying growth industry engaged in a thrilling “war against crime,” and war imagery has inured citizens to the idea that crime is committed by a special class of moral monsters who deserve no better than they get. (ibid.)

Public executions in Europe, like Lynchings in America, came to be rejected in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries for the vulgarity of public theatrical spectacle they generated. The death penalty, when conducted in private, was considered more in keeping with “the civilized code of norms and conduct” (Pratt 2002: 17-18). By the 1960s we see discursive links made by abolitionists between enlightened, “civilized societies” and abolition of the death penalty: “If we continue with the death penalty it will be for revenge, an admission that we are living in the dark ages” (ibid.: 29). The death penalty was feared by many “to [potentially] unleash penal sensitivities and emotion which the civilized world demanded be repressed and hidden away” (ibid.: 31).

I was recognized by the US Supreme Court in Furman v Georgia (1972 408 US 238, 296-7) when declaring the death penalty a cruel and unusual punishment, that ‘one role of the constitution is to help the nation become “more civilized.” (ibid.: 33)

But Christie observes that, death penalty aside, mere imprisonment in contemporary systems of crime control have the potential to develop into Western types of Gulags, which, while they do not exterminate, remove undesirables, as the (racialized) monstrous “other,” from ordinary social life:

They have the potentiality of transforming what otherwise would have been those persons’ most active life-span into an existence very close to the German expression of a life not worth living. (Christie 2000:14)

Some refer to our current profit-driven, super-incarceration where nothing more is sought than efficient confinement as a racialized, “new concentration camp model” (Cayley 1998: 8-9). Many scholars warn us against an increasingly “uncivil society,” declaring that a “decisive test of civilization’ lies before us” (ibid.:11).

**Conclusion**

George Stinney Jr. became little more than a pawn in a trial that was subsumed by a public negotiation and spectacle of white southerners’ defense against northern surveillance and the desire for national belonging through racialized alliances. Hastily abandoned by his counsel following the verdict, Stinney would die in the electric chair on June 16, 1944. Citing Modris Ekstein’s observation that nations at war tend to reveal prevalent values, Carolyn Strange (1996:131) notes “executives, faced with the unpalatable decision whether to execute or commute, articulate the central tenets of their polity.” White rejection of spectacle Lynchings involved a complex, nuanced set of reasons deeply connected to fears of an endangered, defeated South and negotiations of wider national identity. The shift from lynching spectacles to show trials overtly demonstrating white lawfulness appeared to herald post-racialism, but then as now, surface reforms only veil old biases, reinscribing them.
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Reflecting on Race, Class, and Identity: Brazilians in North Georgia

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Immigrants in the United States are often forced into racial and ethnic groupings of which they might not previously have considered themselves members, or in some cases, into categories they do not understand or did not realize existed before immigrating. In this paper, we discuss the results of semi-structured interviews, focused on perceptions of race, class, and identity in Brazil and the U.S., with first generation Brazilian immigrants to north Georgia. We were interested in comparing the stories of Brazilians in the Atlanta metropolitan area with ethnographic studies of Brazilian immigrants in other parts of the U.S. Our purpose was to uncover ways in which the Atlanta area, where there is a significant Black middle and upper class and a burgeoning population of immigrants from Latin America, affected perceptions of race and class held by Brazilians of different skin tones and socioeconomic backgrounds. Participants discussed problems they felt existed with the black/white binary in the United States as well as the categories “Hispanic” and “Latino.” Participants also deconstructed the differences they felt existed in the race/class hierarchies in their communities in Brazil as contrasted with the U.S. and north Georgia specifically.

In early fall of 2009, the editor of the newspaper Atlanta Latino, Judith Martinez, contacted the principal author of this article for an anthropological perspective on a new, federally-mandated survey being distributed in the public schools in Georgia. In the survey, students (or their parents, on their behalf) were required to self-identify in two categories: “race” and “ethnicity.” In the category of “ethnicity,” there was only one choice: “Hispanic/Latino,” which refers to “a person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or Central American, or other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race,” or “not Hispanic/Latino” (Georgia Department of
The terms for “race”—American Indian or Alaska native, Asian, Black or African American, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, and White—were explained in terms of region of ancestry; for example, “White” refers to “a person having origins in the original peoples of Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa” (Georgia Department of Education 2009a). Respondents could choose more than one category for “race”. In some ways, this is a novel approach by the United States government, in acknowledging that a cultural and linguistic group may include people of different phenotypes and ancestral regions. However, it also implies that Hispanic/Latino is the only “ethnicity” that exists in the United States and further “others” Hispanics/Latinos as “ethnics”. In her article, entitled “Cartas Racistas?” (“Racist Letters?”), Martinez (2009) reported that members of the Latino community in Atlanta were confused and distressed and some parents “entered into an existential crisis” after receiving letters informing them of this new requirement for self-identification (Martinez 2009). Suddenly Hispanic/Latino was no longer a race, as they had previously been led to believe, and questions arose in the Latino community in Atlanta about whether the survey was specifically targeting them in an attempt to further stigmatize or penalize this group.

The principal author, engaged in research with the Brazilian community in north Georgia, considered the implications of this survey for Brazilian Americans, who are typically classified as Latinos (or, erroneously, as Hispanics) by non-Brazilians in the United States; this new survey maintains the traditional invisibility (Margolis 1994, 1997) of this group in the United States, but outside of, rather than within, the panethnic category Hispanic/Latino, which is limited to people with origins in Spanish-speaking nations/cultures in this particular survey. Following the wording of the survey, Brazilian students would have to classify themselves as “not Hispanic/Latino” in terms of ethnicity. This survey is one of many examples of the complexities of negotiating racial and ethnic categories in the United States.

In this paper, we discuss perceptions of racial and ethnic categories and social class held by 28 first generation Brazilian immigrants who live in the Atlanta metropolitan area. The majority of Brazilians to North Georgia are recent arrivals, with most immigration taking place within the past 10-15 years. Though fewer than 5,000 Brazilians were recorded in the 2000 census (Atlanta Regional Commission 2004), distributed primarily in North Fulton, Cobb, Dekalb, and Gwinnett counties, many Brazilians in Atlanta remain uncounted; though some are undocumented, some may have been undercounted in the census. Also, many Brazilians have arrived in the area since 2000. Unofficial estimates of the numbers of Brazilians in metropolitan Atlanta range from 20,000 to 50,000 (Pascual 2004, Menezes et al. 2008). In this region, there are a number of strip malls where it is possible to recreate a regional Brazilian experience, with Brazilian-owned and -themed restaurants, grocery stores, bakeries, clothing stores, beauty salons, money-transfer agencies, and bookstores. Brazilian Protestant (of a variety of denominations) and Catholic Churches, with services held in Portuguese, are also prominent and provide important networks for recent Brazilian arrivals to north Georgia.
Caroline Brettel (2003) has given excellent examples of how the city or region of context of immigration plays a vital role in immigrant experiences. A place’s history, economy, and geography (including not only the geographical layout of the urban, suburban, and rural areas but also spatial arrangement of ethnic communities and racial minorities) influence decisions people make about migrating to that area and shape what their experiences will be. Atlanta and particularly its suburbs have been appealing destinations for many immigrant groups in part because of the low cost of real estate in the wake of the relative abandonment of these areas by working class Whites in the 1970s with the movement of their jobs overseas (Holt 2004). It has also been a major destination for many middle- and upper-class African Americans from other parts of the United States in recent years, with over 371,000 African Americans moving to a 20-county segment of the Atlanta metropolitan region between 2000 and 2006, “which is approximately 41 percent of all growth experienced during the period” (Atlanta Regional Commission 2008:1). A number of immigrants from Latin America and internal Latin American migrants from other North American cities to Atlanta brought the “Hispanic” population from seven to ten percent of the region’s population between 2000 and 2006 (Atlanta Regional Commission 2007). Given the cultural, ethnic, and racial backdrop of the region, we were interested in asking Brazilians how they viewed themselves in relation to pre-existing categories of race in the United States, particularly in terms of conceptions of Black, White, and Hispanic or Latino. In addition, we were interested in how class associations with certain racial categories and phenotypical traits in Brazil affected self-perception and understandings of class and race.

“Brazuca” Studies

The first major wave of Brazilian immigrants to the United States occurred during the Brazilian economic crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s, a time characterized by rampant inflation and government policies that took a heavy toll on the middle class. Because of this crisis, a large number of Brazilians emigrated to work in the United States, Europe, and Japan. Maxine Margolis (1994) conducted ethnographic research on Brazilian immigrants in New York City during this time period. She noted that many among this group of immigrants came from middle class backgrounds; some had advanced degrees but took service-industry jobs in the United States. Their intention was, generally, to save enough money to return to Brazil in a more secure financial position. Margolis was the first to note that Brazilians in the United States were under- or unrepresented by the U.S. census because of the lack of a “racial” category for them. For example, in the 1990 census, if Brazilians chose not to include themselves in the “Spanish/Hispanic” category, which as Portuguese-speakers would not apply to them, they would not be counted as Brazilians (Margolis 1994: 252-257).

Recent research suggests that today, more Brazilians from a variety of social classes and backgrounds within Brazil are immigrating to the United States, some with plans to stay permanently and others who plan to eventually return home. Recent social science research on Brazilian immigrants to other parts of
the United States has been conducted in the Boston area (DeBiaggi 2003, Marrow 2003, Martes 2000), South Florida (Alves and Ribeiro 2002, Resende 2009), New Orleans (Gibson 2008), and Los Angeles (Beserra 2003, 2005). Becoming Brazuca¹: Brazilian Immigration to the United States, an edited volume published in 2008, contains chapters from many of the contemporary scholars on this topic (Jouët-Pastré and Braga, eds. 2008).

Due to its recent formation, only a handful of studies have been conducted to date on Brazilians in north Georgia. The Atlanta Regional Commission (2004) and Brazilian-American organizations in Atlanta, such as ASCOMBRA (Associação da Comunidade Brasileira) (Menezes et al. 2008) have compiled preliminary demographic and basic ethnographic data on this community. A recent study (Vasquez, Ribeiro, and Alves 2008)² focused on the important roles that Brazilian churches play in the lives of Brazilian immigrants to this area. In particular, services provided by church members extended well beyond spiritual goals to include assisting parishioners with finding employment and housing and with accessing healthcare. In addition, human geographer Alan Marcus included the Brazilian community of Marietta, Georgia in a transnational study of sending and receiving communities that also entailed extensive research in Framingham, Massachusetts and two small cities in Brazil (Piracanjuba in the state of Goiás and Governador Valadares in Minas Gerais) (Marcus 2009a, 2009b). Both are important sending communities for Brazilians in the United States, and a significant portion of immigrants to the Atlanta area come from Minas Gerais and Goiás. Marcus noted how Brazilians in both Massachusetts and Georgia recreated familiar spaces and maintained “Brazilianness” through satellite television, which offered access to major Brazilian television networks, and through the services offered by Brazilian-American restaurants, groceries, salons, and churches (Marcus 2009a). He also noted how frequent movements of Brazilians between the United States and Brazil, in the kind of “yo-yo migration” also described by Margolis (1994: 263), creates new perceptions of the United States within sending communities in Brazil and new expectations for potential migrants.

Since 2006, the principal author has conducted qualitative research on the Brazilian community in Atlanta. This research has consisted of participant observation at a number of events of the Brazilian community, social visits to the homes of Brazilian Americans, and meeting with representatives of Brazilian churches, businesses, and organizations (in particular, the Atlanta-Rio de Janeiro Sister Cities Committee). The principal author has also collected a number of publications of the Brazilian community in north Georgia, including the magazines Viver, Cia. Brasil, and Jornal Moderno. Through a series of fundraising events held in Atlanta that were organized by her students at Georgia State University for

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¹ Brazuca (sometimes spelled brazuka) is a slang term in Portuguese for Brazilians in the U.S.
² This research was conducted as part of a multi-year Ford Foundation grant led by Manuel Vásquez, Department of Religion, and Phillip Williams, Department of Political Science, University of Florida.
a Brazilian NGO, the principal author has also had an opportunity to meet several Brazilian business owners and artists. Finally, in co-organizing and presenting research results (White 2008) at “Brazilian-Americans in Georgia and Beyond: a Multi-Disciplinary Symposium,” held April 25-26, 2008 in Athens and Atlanta, the principal author had an opportunity to meet representatives of the recently reopened Brazilian Consulate in Atlanta as well as other prominent members of the Brazilian business and religious community.

The above contacts and experiences in the Brazilian community prompted some of the questions that we addressed in formal interviews. As a picture of the Brazilian population in north Georgia came together, several features stood out that led to a focus on race, class, and ethnicity in this study. Brazilians of a number of social classes, including many from the working class, seemed to be immigrating to Atlanta. A number of questions arose from these experiences with Brazilians in the Atlanta area, including: How do Brazilians of different social classes and racial identities in Brazil interact in the United States? What aspects of “community” exist that unite these groups? Do interactions with non-Brazilians or with Brazilian immigrants of different social classes change embodied notions of Brazilian class structures (as reported in interview exchanges reported by [Resende 2009: 100-

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3 The principal author has met Brazilians who reside in Georgia and elsewhere in the United States who come from the most modest of backgrounds, from favela or shantytown communities, for example. The large number of Brazilian Protestant Evangelical Churches in the Atlanta area is another possible indication that many working class immigrants were migrating to Atlanta, since participation in Evangelical Protestantism is more common among the working class in Brazil. A publication that first alerted the principal author to the fact that there were a number of Brazilian Evangelical churches in the area was the 2003-2004 Páginas Amarelas Brasileiras e Guía de Recursos de Atlanta (Brazilian Yellow Pages and Guide to Resources in Atlanta) (Longshore 2004). This book lists 29 Brazilian churches and several others with services in Portuguese in the metropolitan Atlanta area. Among the Brazilian churches, numerous branches of known Brazilian Evangelical/Pentecostal Churches were listed, including six branches of the Brazilian Assembly of God Church (Assembléia de Deus), one branch of the Igreja Universal Reino de Deus, one branch of the Igreja Videira, one branch of the Igreja Nova Vida. In addition, four churches with “Evangélica” and/or “Pentecostal” in their names and one Seventh-Day Adventist church were in this guide. However, the link between working class background and Evangelical Protestantism was an assumption and is not necessarily the case in the context of immigration, in which, as Martes [2004] has noted, many Brazilians join churches they did not belong to in Brazil for the social capital they provide. The principal author’s previous research experience in Brazil focused on experiences of Hansen’s disease (leprosy) treatment in Rio de Janeiro, and through conversations with Brazilians in Atlanta she learned of a small number of people in treatment for this disease in this city; this also led to speculation about the socioeconomic background of migrants. Although rich and poor can contract this disease, there are correlations between certain living conditions (crowded housing, for example, and unplanned urban development) that are associated with this disease (Kerr-Pontes et al. 2004).
in her recent Ph.D. dissertation on Brazilians in South Florida)? How are Brazilian attitudes about class and color affected by exposure to corresponding attitudes and practices in the American South? How do Brazilians who self-identify as “black” in both Brazil and the United States interpret their racialized identities in both locations? Another long-term goal of this research was to identify areas for future research with the Brazilian community in north Georgia, including unmet needs of this community, which will be discussed further in the conclusions of this paper.

**Culture, Identity, and Immigration**

This study fits within a wide body of literature that addresses the ways in which racial, ethnic, and social class identities are understood and transformed in immigration and transnational contexts. Kearney and Bessera (2004:3) suggested that worldwide, “[c]oncern with social class has been eclipsed by a fascination with identity and identity politics,” in which race/ethnic categories or nationality takes precedence. We focus on “class” and “race” together as elements of analysis because the cultural constructions of these two concepts are tightly intertwined in Brazil, and because we were interested in how Brazilians’ perceptions change with migration. When people immigrate to the United States, they are usually pressured to classify themselves, on official documents and in social contexts, in terms of “race.” They are also exposed to a different system of class relations and are compelled to position themselves in relation to other immigrants of the same nationality, recent immigrants from other nations, and other residents in the host country. The categories they choose may be related to a number of factors, including the class associations that accompany different ethnic/racial terms in host and sending nations, language abilities and phenotypical traits of immigrants, and the composition of the population in the region of settlement.

Phenotype can create expectations of “racial” and cultural affinity, particularly in the United States. Immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa or nations of the African diaspora, such as Haiti or Brazil, may or may not choose to adopt an African American identity. However, the cultural differences between black immigrants and African Americans are vast, as Philippe Wamba (2000) noted in his autobiography, *Kinship: A Family’s Journey in Africa and America*. He expressed the mixed feelings of solidarity and disconnection with African Americans, who he thought were generally uninformed about African cultures, history, and politics, even within academic circles in the United States. Alan and Carol Stepick, in ethnographic research with immigrant youth in Miami, found that Haitian adolescents rarely used the term “African American” or “Black”, though they associated with African

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4 Resende (2009:100-103) presents the stories of three Brazilian women whose acceptance of the norms of the Brazilian class system changed after immigrating to the United States. One woman (“Raquel Elis”), for example, from an elite São Paulo family, felt that she had been raised in a bubble, and “[d]espite having lived in one of the world’s biggest metropolises, filled with the social problems of urban poverty, Raquel Elis had somehow missed ‘reality’ until encountering it in South Florida” (Resende 2009: 102).
Americans frequently and adopted certain cultural features of this group (Stepick and Stepick 2003). In his ethnography of Nuer immigrants in Minnesota, Jon Holtzman (2008:117) observed that while “there is a tendency for younger Nuer to emulate the styles of African Americans . . . the Nuer report instances of tension with some African Americans that far exceed those experienced with whites.”

The propensity in the United States to create panethnic categories can be problematic for many immigrants, as these categories fuse peoples of different nationalities and backgrounds under a single label. Several authors have noted that many Latin American immigrants prefer to identify with their national background and often reject the label Hispanic/Latino label (Calderón 1992, Lopez and Espiritu 1990, Stepick and Stepick 2003, Yarborough 2008). In the Atlanta area, for example, “Hispanic” is often assumed to be synonymous with “Mexican” among many native-born Americans. Central American migrants, who may often share phenotypical traits with Mexican immigrants, reported that their national identity is often erased in interactions with Whites and Blacks who were born in the U.S. (Yarborough 2010).

In this study, we focused primarily on first generation adult immigrants. In looking at immigration and identity, however, it is important to consider how generational differences and length of time spent in the United States affect self-perception in terms of racial and class identities (Stepick and Stepick 2003). Second generation children may be more willing to adopt U.S. categories of race, class, and identity than their parents. Bernadete Bessera, in her ethnography of Brazilian immigrants in California, has a good example of this in the story of a Brazilian American boy, born in the U.S., whose father was “black” and mother was “white” and who “had difficulty finding the right group to socialize with.” His family strongly discouraged him from associating with Chicanos or African Americans “because they were seen as ‘marginal,’” even though he felt more comfortable with these groups. Bessera wrote that Brazilian parents often do not understand that “the process of ‘whitening’ that is so common to Brazilian racist ideology does not work in the United States” (2003: 115-116). In general, the negotiation of identity in a foreign context must be looked at as a complex and ongoing process for immigrants and for their children.

**Methods and Population**

The information presented in this paper is based primarily on formal, semi-structured interviews conducted between 2006-2008 with first generation Brazilian immigrants who were residing within the metropolitan Atlanta region (designated as a 28-county area by the U.S. Census) (Atlanta Regional Commission 2008). A 2007-2008 Research Initiation Grant from Georgia State University provided funding for a portion of this research. We conducted formal interviews with 28 participants (15 men and 13 women, ranging in age from 20-54 at the time of their interviews in 2007-2008), all of whom were first generation immigrants to the United States. We used a detailed interview schedule that included 45 questions about participants’ backgrounds, conceptions of class structure in
Brazil and the United States, racial identity (both how people identify themselves and are identified by others in Brazil and the United States), motivations for immigration, maintenance of Brazilian identity, perceptions of solidarity in the Brazilian community, and degree of participation in this community. Participants were encouraged to expand on the questions they were asked. Interviews took place in a variety of locations, including the café sections of Brazilian grocery stores, private homes and apartments, and, in a few cases, via e-mail response. Participants were recruited through snowball sampling and convenience sampling (Bernard 2002: 184-186). In-person interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed by research assistants and the principal author. All research assistants conducting interviews (co-authors on this paper) were also Brazilians living in the Atlanta area; all had undergraduate and graduate training in the social sciences and completed the requisite IRB training before conducting interviews. For this paper, the principal author extracted relevant background information on each participant and compiled participants’ answers to the following three questions:

How did you identify yourself in terms of race or ethnicity in Brazil? In the United States?

How do non-Brazilians categorize you in terms of race or ethnicity here in the United States (if you have any examples of this from your acquaintances, employers, or others)?

Could you discuss any differences you see in terms of how race is understood in Brazil and the United States?

The principal author tallied the basic answers to the first two questions. For many participants, all three questions generated narratives. Using a grounded theory approach (Bernard 2002, Glaser and Strauss 1967), the principal author took note of changes in self-identification and identification by others in the context of immigration and identified themes in qualitative answers related to these changes.

Though there is a significant presence of Brazilians from the states of Goiás and Minas Gerais in north Georgia (with supermarkets and restaurants catering specifically to these populations), the diverse regional backgrounds of study participants indicate that Brazilians from all over Brazil consider making Atlanta a permanent or temporary home. Interview participants were born and/or grew up in the states of Rio Grande do Norte (8 interviewees), Goiás (6), Rio de Janeiro (5), São Paulo (3), Bahia (2), Amazonas (3), Pará (1), Tocantins (1), and Maranhão (1).^5^ Most interview participants came to the U.S. by plane. Some came legally for work or to study. Atlanta was the first destination for some, but others had lived

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5 Some respondents mentioned living in more than one state before coming to the United States.
elsewhere in the U.S. before deciding to come to Atlanta. Others came on tourist visas, which they overstayed. A few interviewees, however, traveled to Mexico and entered the United States through undocumented border crossings. Housecleaning is a common profession for many Brazilian immigrant women in Atlanta, as in other cities in the U.S. (Margolis 1994; Martes 2000) and was the most common profession among women participants interviewed for this study. One man also worked as a housecleaner; in participant observation research, the principal author met whole families involved in housecleaning businesses, in which parents and adult children work together. Many Brazilian men in the Atlanta area are involved in construction, which was also a profession of several men interviewed. Other occupations among the participants in this study were painter, taxi driver, graphic designer, jiu-jitsu instructor, grocery store supervisor, computer programmer, government program coordinator, university student, and intern at the Centers for Disease Control.

The primary motivations for coming to the United States were economic, and many interview participants who struggled financially in Brazil have seen an improvement in their financial situation. For example, Ivanete6, (born in 1953, from Rio Grande do Norte state) who worked in housecleaning in Atlanta, noted that in a short period of time in the U.S. it is possible to save money and buy a house. She said, “In Brazil, no! In Brazil you would have to work years, years, and more years to be able to get a house.” She said that in the U.S., “you have money to buy things; you’re not always owing. You’re not always waiting until the end of the month, like in Brazil; money is easier as it comes weekly when you need it, giving you a better quality of life.”

Despite the financial advantages of living in the U.S., several participants said that the difficulties they (or friends and family members) faced in obtaining legal status or improving the status that they currently held was a major drawback to living here. Stringent immigration laws have also made life difficult for many Brazilians in Georgia. In February of 2008, for example, the Georgia Senate passed a bill that increases penalties for driving without a license and that allows for checks on immigration status if someone is pulled over and does not have a license (MSNBC 2008). People who work in housecleaning are especially dependent on driving to homes for their livelihood, so this restriction was particularly harsh and has prompted some immigrants to the Atlanta area to return to Brazil.

**New Categories in the Context of Immigration**

Helen Marrow, in research on Brazilians in Boston, noted that while Brazilians are initially forced into categories such as Hispanic or Latino by non-Brazilians in the United States, many distance themselves from these categories, emphasizing that they are “Brazilian-Americans,” as they become aware of stigmatizing associations with the Hispanic/Latino ethnic identification (Marrow 2003). Judith McDonnell and Cileine de Lourenço had a similar finding in interviews focused on race, ethnicity, and gender roles with Brazilian women in the Boston area. These women

6 All interviewee names are pseudonyms.
also expressed frustration with the available ethnic and racial categories in the United States, and “[often] they lay claim to a ‘fourth space’ that teeters closely to the space of ‘other’ because Brazilians often do not see themselves in the racialized categories of Latina, Latin American, and certainly not Hispanic” (McDonnell and de Lourenço 2008: 164).

Most participants in this study gave distinct answers to the two questions about what they believed their racial category to be in Brazil and how they were identified by others (principally non-Brazilians) in the United States. Participants included Brazilians who said they were identified as black (preto), brown (pardo), mestizo (mestiço), white (branco), and Japanese-Brazilian, with the majority identifying as white. Most said that they were identified by non-Brazilians as Latino/a or Hispanic. A few respondents said they did not know their racial category in Brazil because they had never had to consider it before.

Some people reflected on how changes in category in the host country changed their experience or self-perception. For Daniel and Carlos, this involved a reinforcement of Brazilian identity over others. Daniel, a twenty-seven year-old graphic designer originally from Salvador, Bahia, said:

I consider myself mestizo [mestiço] or brown [pardo], despite my family having come from Portugal, but I also have indigenous ancestry. In the United States, I really don’t know how to place myself [me encaixar]. At first I considered myself Latino, but as I stayed longer in this country, people confused me for Greek or Italian, but I think I am just Brazilian. I don’t feel included in the Latino community that lives in the United States.

Carlos (born 1970), a Japanese-Brazilian originally from São Paulo who works as a Java developer, had an interesting comment about race and identity in the immigration experience. He said he felt more Brazilian among other Brazilians since he came to Atlanta: “Culturally, I’m totally Brazilian here or in Brazil, but by appearance I’m Asian or Japanese.” He was seen by non-Brazilians in the U.S., though, as “Asian, without a doubt.” He was “othered” in similar ways in Brazil and the United States, but among Brazilians in the United States, the solidarity of “Brazilianness” in a foreign context trumped the otherness of his Japanese heritage. Tsuda (2003) found a similar phenomenon among Japanese-Brazilians who immigrated to Japan as they discover they stand out as foreigners in Japan and are culturally very Brazilian. One of his interviewees said that while in Brazil he felt “really Japanese,” since moving to Japan his “identity is more on the Brazilian than on the Japanese side” (Tsuda 2003: 167).

In research with Brazilians in Newark, Ramos-Zayas (2008:281) reported that

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7 These two answers (white in Brazil/Latino or Hispanic in the U.S.) did not go together in every case (for example, one participant identified as “white” in Brazil but was considered “black” by non-Brazilians in the U.S.; some said they were considered “white” in both countries, with no “Latino” label).
“various versions of Brazil’s ‘racial democracy’ discourse were deployed in most of my conversations with Brazilian migrants.” Racial categories are flexible and far more numerous in Brazil than in the U.S., often consisting of physical descriptors of skin tone or hair type but, as anthropologist Marvin Harris (1964:60) noted, after conducting extensive research on racial terms in Brazil, “there is an ideal racial ranking gradient, in which whites occupy the favorable extreme.” Despite this assessment, Harris still saw discrimination as a product of class membership primarily. However, Brazil is far from a racial democracy, and active discrimination (in the workplace, on the street, in the media, and in popular discourse) against those with phenotypical traits commonly associated with sub-Saharan African descent is still present in Brazil (Caldwell 2004, Goldstein 2003, Hanchard 1999).

In response to the question, “Could you discuss any differences you see in terms of how race is understood in Brazil and the United States?,” most Brazilians interviewed in this study perceived more “racism” (racismo) in the U.S. than in Brazil (though “racism” was not mentioned in the question). However, participants used the term “racism” to talk about a number of forms of discrimination (e.g., based on skin color, language ability, or immigration status). Some cited an overemphasis with categorizing peoples in the U.S. For some participants, the interview questions for this project further illustrated to them that discussing and deconstructing “race” was a typical obsession in this country.\(^8\)

One interviewee elaborated on the differences she felt existed between the Brazil and the United States in terms of specific examples of classism vs. racism, respectively. Marilda was born in 1981 and grew up in the state of Tocantins, from a self-described poor background. She identified herself as white (branca) in Brazil and said she was identified as Latina or Hispanic in the U.S. She commented, “Here, your color, your ethnicity, is a motive for racism; if you went shopping here (in the U.S.) wearing flip-flops (chinelos), you would get good service,” whereas she claims that would not be the case in Brazil.\(^9\)

Marilda also gave an example of a hypothetical U.S. interaction that illustrated the importance of skin color here: If you were in line at a bank trying to solve a problem, if you had an

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\(^8\) In research with Brazilians in South Florida, Resende (2009:103) chose not to ask people about their “race” or “color” because she thought “it would taint our interactions by characterizing me as an American researcher (because many participants reported that Americans are obsessed with racial classification).”

\(^9\) The principal author, in thinking about her comment, remembered multiple times in Brazil when she had received excellent service despite wearing flip-flops in Brazil. As a white, blonde North American woman, the principal author believed the privileges of skin and hair color typically outweighed dress and shoe type, although her status as a foreigner could also have played a part in these interactions. In general, though, flip-flops are more typically associated with the working class in Brazil. It is also interesting to note that Brazilian Havaianas brand flip-flops have in recent years have come to be considered a “designer” label abroad and in Brazil, as Rodrigues (2006) notes in a thesis entitled, “Havaianas: Do Pobre ao Nobre” (“Havaianas: From Poor to Rich/Elite”).
attendant who is not your color, and if you had someone behind you in line that was his (the attendant’s) color, he would help the other person first. Especially the Blacks (*negros*). They are very racist, principally with Latinos, Whites—in general.

By “Blacks” here, she is referring to African Americans (as opposed to Black Brazilians). Although Marilda does not include herself in this example, it seems to reflect her perception of something similar that happened to her or to acquaintances in the United States. While such a scenario could theoretically occur, her interpretation of motives on the part of the hypothetical attendant may be influenced by embodied notions of authority, social class, and color in Brazil, where it might be rare to see a person who would be considered “black” in Brazil in the position of bank teller (as is quite common in Atlanta). In addition, regardless of the skin color or racial identity of the bank teller in Brazil, bank clients who would be considered “black” in Brazil would be less likely to experience privileges over “white” clients.

Julia (born in 1976) grew up middle-class in São Paulo and studied at the University of Massachusetts in Lowell before moving to Atlanta; she said she “never had to think about” her racial category in Brazil, but “in the U.S.A, I don’t even know, there are so many terms (*existe tanta denominação*) that it’s difficult to know where I fit, or rather, into what box the country puts me.” Non-Brazilians, she said, classify her as Latina. When asked about differences in race relations between Brazil in the United States, she said:

I just had a 30 minute discussion about this [with someone else, before the interview], so I’m a little tired of this issue. I was raised to not differentiate someone because of their color or because of their appearance. The U.S.A. and especially ATL [Atlanta] are extremely divided between whites and blacks. This question of “division” is one of the things that makes me most uncomfortable about this country.

Her comments reflect a colorblind paradigm, in which the white/black binary is construed as furthering hostility between these groups (rather than reflecting a legacy of slavery and discriminatory practices based on skin color and racial category).

In contrast, Rosane (born in 1980, from a middle class background in Rio de Janeiro) thought that racism was more pronounced in Brazil than in the United States. Rosane, who said her racial category in Brazil was “white” in Brazil and is “Latina” in the United States, believed that “in America, they have more respect than in Brazil with regard to this issue.” Márcia (born in 1959), from Manaus, Amazonas, also said that racism among “Whites in Brazil” was much stronger than it is in the United States, a conclusion she based on personal experience. The example she gave in her interview was related more to issues of social class and linguistic difference rather than skin color. Márcia, who said she was viewed as “white” in both Brazil and the U.S., grew up in an upper class family in Manaus, Amazonas but worked as a housecleaner in Georgia. She said that when she first
came to the United States, she “couldn’t even say ‘bye-bye’, and yet they accepted me. In Brazil, they would never accept a gringa in their homes who didn’t speak Portuguese, and yet here they do.” As someone who grew up with servants in the home, the role reversal and the positive experience she had with employers here led her to critique what she saw as discriminatory practices in Brazil.

Francisco (born in 1978) emphasized the importance of class as it relates to racial relations in Brazil. He grew up in Rio de Janeiro in a working class family; his mother was a manicurist and father was a taxi driver, and he attended public school in Brazil. He said he identified as preto (black) in Brazil but was identified by non-Brazilians in the U.S. as “Latino.” What he found most interesting about race relations in the United States was that here, “the poor and rich use [the terms] white and black.” In other words, middle and upper class people of African descent in the United States do not abandon their racial category or identity as Black Americans. This is in contrast to Brazil, where traditionally it is said that “money whitens.” A person’s racial category can become lighter (from preto to mulato or even branco) with an increase in socioeconomic status. However, it is important to note that this practice is not universal in Brazil, where a growing number of Black Brazilian artists, writers, politicians, and business people willingly identify as preto (“black”) or as Afro-Brazilians and embrace Black heritage.

Some scholars of Brazilians in the U.S. have noted that Brazilians who considered themselves “white” (branco), mulato, or moreno, or other categories that were not “black” (preto) in Brazil, are surprised to find themselves categorized as “black” or “African-American” in the U.S. or forced to choose between “black” or “white” (Fazito and Martes 2004, cited in Margolis 2008; McDonnell and de Lourenço 2008; Ramos-Zaya 2008). Stepick and Stepick (2003: 141) note that the same is true for many Latin American immigrants: “It is a cliché in Miami to hear a Caribbean immigrant proclaim, ‘I didn’t know I was black until I came to the United States.”’ Ramos-Zaya found that Brazilians in Newark, New Jersey “rejected identification with Blackness, except in instances when Blackness equated with urbaness, a desired attribute deployed in contradistinction to the rural ‘folksiness’ of other Latin American immigrants” (2008:280). One of the participants in this study, Wilma (34 years old at the time of interview), from a working class background in Goiás, said that she sees herself as “white” (“I think I’m white, not black” [Acho que sou branca, negra não]), but in the United States she is seen by others as “negra” (black), though she did not perceive discrimination in the United States because of this.

For several interviewees, racism in the United States was discussed in terms of discriminatory attitudes and policies in the United States towards immigrants. As Alexandre (27 at the time of the interview, from Maranhão), who identified himself as “Brazilian” but is often seen as “Hispanic” by non-Brazilians in the U.S., commented, “There (in Brazil), there is [racism] against blacks in general, that is still very strong. Here there’s the prejudices of blacks and white not liking each other, but there is also [racism] against immigrants, Catholics, Hispanics, Hindus, Muslims; Americans have prejudice against these people that come here and don’t learn American culture.” Marcelo (born 1973, from Rio Grande do Norte) stated,
"I, thank God, am legalized here, but I really hope the situation improves. I think the current situation is not good. First they need to legalize the people who are already here because if that is not done, the U.S. will suffer, and if this is done, everyone will gain, because the majority of the force that moves this country is made up of immigrants." Gerson (born in 1976), from Goiás, who recounted a harrowing journey to the United States via the Mexican border, believed that anti-immigration laws were “pressuring people to not treat [immigrants] well,” that stringent laws have created a “sub-society” (sub-sociedade) within in the United States, in the sense of an underclass subject to racism and discriminatory practices. The forms of exclusion that resulted from undocumented status in particular were a major concern and resulted in a diminished quality of life for several participants.

**Discussion: Implications and Applications for Future Research**

Anthropologists Claudia Strauss and Naomi Quinn (1994:287) have discussed how humans learn, from infancy, cultural schemas or ways of seeing and perceiving the world, but these schemas “are not rigid cognitive structures.” They provide people with a certain worldview, but “schemas do not act as gatekeepers, preventing inputs from being sensed. An incident that fails to fit one’s existing schemas can be perceived as such and may even be long remembered because it was surprising” (Strauss and Quinn 1994:290). In the principal author’s earlier research on Hansen’s disease in Brazil, she observed the ability of people affected by the disease to shift or adapt to new ways of conceptualizing their illness, when presented with the biomedical model and throughout the experience of treatment. Just as explanatory models of illness are quite flexible (White 2003, Kleinman 1989), so too are cognitive models for understanding identity in transnational contexts. The process of coming to terms with new racial categories and a different class system fits with what Sherry Ortner has termed “serious games” (Ortner 1996:12-16). Immigrants are active agents in negotiating identity and often play “with “skill, intention, wit, intelligence” (Ortner 1996:12), but there are high stakes in the sense that the choices they make can affect daily life and opportunities in the host country.

How might immigrants apply or interpret newly acquired knowledge of new models of race, ethnicity, and class in the host society? What are the practical implications of identifying or not identifying with a particular racial or ethnic category? In the United States, membership in different minority groups affords privileges in some contexts and disadvantages in others. Most Brazilians interviewed for this study were very aware that they were seen as “Latino” by non-Brazilians. However, they did not necessarily feel a part of that category. To reiterate Daniel’s statement above, he does not “feel included in the Latino community.” It is possible that Brazilians who do not feel they are a part of the wider Latino community (or who are explicitly excluded from this ethnic grouping, as in the survey mentioned at the beginning of this article) will miss out on access to services that may be available to this group. Non-profit organizations with Spanish titles or who advertise their services strictly in Spanish may leave Brazilians
feeling excluded. For example, Brazilian youth may not realize they are eligible for Latino scholarships. Outreach to the Brazilian community is one means through which Brazilians can be made aware of social services that can be helpful to them. For example, at a breakfast (attended by the principal author) sponsored by the Brazilian airline TAM and intended for Brazilian-American business, church, and community leaders, a physician who worked with a clinic for women in north Georgia spoke and requested that attendees disseminate information about the clinic to the wider community, as Portuguese, as well as Spanish, translators were available at this clinic. Providing the Brazilian community with information on the services to which they are eligible as “Latinos” or as immigrants in general also could be accomplished through outreach activities in public schools with large numbers of Brazilian students, Brazilian churches, and Brazilian supermarkets in north Georgia.

Through qualitative research beyond the interviews discussed in this paper, the principal author has been able to identify several pressing concerns for Brazilians in north Georgia. These include difficulties in seeking legal residence and citizenship in the United States, problems in accessing healthcare for those who are undocumented and/or uninsured, and educational needs (including teaching materials in Portuguese) for first and 1.5 generation Brazilian children in the public schools. Racial and ethnic identity, both in terms of self-identification and identification of Brazilians in the United States on official documents, are relevant to all of these concerns, in order to ensure that Brazilians are counted and that in formulating policy for different immigrant groups, the linguistic and cultural backgrounds of Brazilians are made visible.

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In addition to the challenges associated with simple access to health services, some Brazilians affected by illnesses that are less common in the United States, such as Hansen’s disease and Chagas disease, have a hard time getting a diagnosis and subsequently finding a proper course of treatment. The principal author is currently conducting research with a small number of Brazilians affected by Hansen’s disease in the Atlanta area.
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